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THE NTH DECREE :
EXAMINING INTRARACIAL USE OF THE N-WORD
IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
Abigail L. Perdue*
Gregory S. Parks**
In 2012, rap moguls Jay-Z and Kanye West won a Grammy for their
hit song “Ni**as1 in Paris.”2  In April 2013, Grammy award-winning
music artist Rihanna posted a photo on Instagram of herself posing
with a black3 toddler; she captioned it “My lil nigga.”4  A few months
later, former NBA star Charles Barkley commented, “I use the N-
* Abigail L. Perdue is an Associate Professor of Legal Analysis, Writing, and Research at
Wake Forest University School of Law.  The author wishes to thank her parents, Janet and David
Perdue, for their unfailing love and support, as well as her outstanding research assistants, Ste-
phen White and Crissy Dixon.
** Gregory S. Parks is an Assistant Professor of Law at Wake Forest University School of
Law.  The author wishes to thank his talented research assistants, LaRita Dingle and Joshua
Adams.  This article is partially based on Gregory S. Parks, “Nigger, Please!”, 3 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. COMMON L. 26 (2013).
1. Throughout the article, the authors sometimes spell out the N-word for the purpose of
clarity, but this does not reflect the daily language or personal views of the authors.  The authors
have generally indicated use of the word “nigger” as “ni**er” and use of the term “nigga” as
“ni**a” unless doing so would confuse the reader.  Additionally, the authors refer to both
“ni**er” and “ni**a” collectively as the N-word, despite some individuals’ beliefs that the two
words have distinct meanings.  To be clear, the authors limit their thesis exclusively to cases
involving use of the N-word in the workplace.  They do not comment on use of the N-word in
other contexts, such as among friends in social settings or in music lyrics.
2. There is nothing novel about Jay-Z and West’s choice of title.  Throughout the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, songs such as “De Nigga Gal’s Dream” and “Who’s Dat Nigga Dar A-
Peepin?” were popular and socially acceptable at the time. RANDALL KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE
STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUBLESOME WORD 6 (2002).
3. Throughout this article, the authors refer to members of the black community as “black”
for the sake of clarity and consistency, although they recognize that individuals self-identify in
various ways, such as African-American. See Martha S. Jones, What’s in a Name? “Mixed,”
“Biracial,” “Black,” CNN LIVING (Feb. 19, 2014, 8:42 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/19/liv-
ing/biracial-black-identity-answers/ (observing the various terms with which members of the bi-
racial community have self-identified through the years).
4. Ernest Owens, Rihanna, the N-Word and Black Social Media Hypocrisy, HUFFPOST BLACK
VOICES (Apr. 23, 2013, 8:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ernest-owens/rihanna-the-
nword-and-bla_b_3167484.html (urging the black community to reach a “consensus” regarding
use of the N-word).
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word.  I’m going to continue to use the N-word . . . .  [W]hat I do with
my black friends is not up to white America . . . .”5
Yet that same year, juries in New York and Alabama concluded
that intraracial use of the N-word is sufficient, under certain circum-
stances, to create a racially hostile work environment.  In Johnson v.
Strive East Harlem Employment Group, black supervisor Rob Car-
mona referred to Brandi Johnson, a black employee, as a “ni**a” mul-
tiple times in a single conversation.6  Although Mr. Carmona stated
that he did not intend the term to be derogatory, a jury in the South-
ern District of New York determined that his use of the N-word was
unlawful, regardless of his race, his personal understanding of the
word, or his alleged intent in using it.  Similarly, in Weatherly v. Ala-
bama State University, three former university employees alleged that
a supervisor frequently used the N-word at the workplace, including
comments like “ni**a shit” and “ni**a bus line.”7  A jury concluded
that the remarks created a racially hostile work environment, and the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed.8  But how can the same word that is in-
cluded in the title of a Grammy-winning song create a hostile work
environment when used by a black supervisor toward a black em-
ployee?  This question highlights the continuing confusion and contro-
versy arising from the black community’s attempts to bring new
meaning to an old and infamous word.
While some members of the black community, including well-
known comedians, athletes, rappers, and entertainers, publicly em-
brace use of the N-word by and among blacks as a term of endear-
ment, others, such as Oprah Winfrey, still view it exclusively as a tool
of racial oppression.9  Harvard Law Professor Randall Kennedy ob-
5. NBA ON TNT: BARKLEY ON GRIFFIN (TNT television broadcast Nov. 14, 2013) [hereinaf-
ter BARKLEY BROADCAST]; see also Billy Haisley, Charles Barkley on Using “Nigga”: White
America Doesn’t Get To Decide, DEADSPIN (Nov. 15, 2013, 5:23 PM), http://deadspin.com/
charles-barkley-on-using-nigga-white-america-doesnt-1465263583.  One has to wonder whether
fellow black athletes Michael Jordan and Tiger Woods share Mr. Barkley’s viewpoint.  NBA
player Michael Jordan was suspended as a child for hitting a white girl who called him the N-
word during a fight over a seat on a school bus. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 22.  When Tiger
Woods was in kindergarten, older students tied him up and called him the N-word. Id.  In 1974,
black comedian Richard Pryor’s comedy skit—“That Nigger’s Crazy”—won a Grammy for Best
Comedy Recording. Id. at 39.  Mr. Pryor is credited with introducing the N-word into stand-up
comedy routines. Id.  Decades later, black comedian Chris Rock began one of his signature skits
by saying “I love black people, but I hate ni**ers.” Id. at 41.
6. 990 F. Supp. 2d 435, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
7. 728 F.3d 1263, 1266 (11th Cir. 2013).
8. Id.
9. See KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 162–63; see also Joe Morton, The N’word as Sculpture, TWIT-
TER (Mar. 2, 2014, 5:52 PM), excerpts available at http://rolandmartinreports.com/blog/2014/03/
joe-morton-the-n-word-as-sculpture/ (“The N-word has been burned into the psyche of black
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served that the N-word “is and has long been the most socially conse-
quential racial insult. . . . [But today] when African Americans are
speaking to each other, ‘nigger,’and especially its more genial cousin,
‘nigga’ can be an affectionate greeting, a compliment, or a term of
respect.”10  In 2007, rapper Nas wanted to title his new album “Nig-
gas” until pressure from his record label and civil rights activists con-
vinced him otherwise.11  During a 2009 television interview with Jay-
Z, Oprah Winfrey explained that to her, the N-word “carries such a
sense of hatred and degradation, [that when she hears the word she]
always think[s] . . . about black men who were lynched and that’s the
last word they heard.”12  Jay-Z disagreed, opining, “People give words
power. . . . [O]ur generation  . . . took the power out of that word. We
turned a word that was very ugly and hurtful into a term of endear-
ment . . . .”13
But if members of the black community cannot reach a consensus
on proper use of the N-word, how can courts and juries be expected to
determine whether its intraracial use is sufficient to create a racially
hostile work environment, and how should that determination be
made?  Should the race of the speaker and target of the speech be
taken into account in determining the existence of a racially hostile
work environment?  In the alternative, if our legal system presumes
that the N-word is per se racially offensive, regardless of the speaker’s
race and intent in using the word, does that restore power to a hurtful
word that an empowered new generation of black Americans has
stripped of its old meaning and refashioned into a term of endearment
and solidarity?
Although strikingly different opinions on use of the N-word have
provoked much debate, the conclusions reached in Johnson and
Weatherly—that intraracial use of the N-word can create a racially
folk in this country not unlike the numbers branded on the bodies of living Jews in concentration
camps . . . .”).
10. Steve Bogira, A Tough Lesson About the N-Word, CHI. READER, Jan. 22, 2013, at 14, 15,
available at http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/teacher-lincoln-brown-sues-cps-over-nword/
Content?oid=8556801 (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) (quoting Professor Randall Kennedy).
11. See Catherine Donaldson-Evans, Record Label Denies Rap Star Nas’ Claim of Forthcom-
ing Album Called “Nigga,” FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/
10/16/record-label-denies-rap-star-nas-claim-forthcoming-album-called-nigga/.  As of the date of
this publication, the album remains untitled.
12. The Oprah Winfrey Show: Jay-Z on the N-Word, (syndicated television broadcast Sept. 24,
2009), available at http://www.oprah.com/oprahshow/Jay-Z-on-the-N-word-Video [hereinafter
Jay-Z Video]; see also Crystal Wright, When Is It Ever OK To Call the President the N-Word?,
CNN (July 8, 2014, 6:41 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/08/opinion/wright-obama-n-word
(criticizing West View News for publishing a story with the headline “The Nigger in the White
House” and describing the N-word as “reprehensible”).
13. Jay-Z Video, supra note 12.
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hostile work environment—are correct because they comport with the
longstanding legal recognition of intraracial, same-sex, and third-party
associative employment discrimination.  The shameful historical leg-
acy of the N-word underscores the extent to which a reasonable per-
son of any race would likely object to its use at the workplace, even if
the speaker is black.  Furthermore, social science research indicates
that black individuals’ implicit antiblack biases may lead to ill-in-
tended use of the N-word against other blacks.  Finally, applying the
same objective standard to intraracial and interracial use of the N-
word, regardless of the speaker’s intent, promotes fairness, consis-
tency, and judicial efficiency.
A.  The N-Word Controversy
Few words in the English language are more deeply embedded in
the nation’s conscience than the N-word.  Although it has been
around for centuries, its meaning remains anything but black and
white.  The N-word originates from niger, the Latin word for the color
black, but by the nineteenth century, it had become a familiar racial
slur.14  Indeed, an 1837 treatise discussing the condition of blacks in
America described the N-word as “an [o]pprobrious term, employed
to impose contempt upon [blacks] as an inferior race . . . [with the]
purpose to injure.”15
Cinematic portrayals underscore this commonly held belief.  For ex-
ample, Lee Daniels’ 2013 film The Butler examines the life of Cecil
Gaines, a black butler who served several American presidents.  In
one poignant scene, young Cecil tells an older black mentor and ex-
pert butler, Mr. Maynard, that Cecil would make a good “house
ni**er.”  Mr. Maynard instantly slaps Cecil, explaining that the N-
word is “a white man’s word . . . filled with hate.”16
Many members of the black community share this view.  In July
2007, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple (NAACP) held a symbolic funeral for the N-word at a historically
14. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 4–5.
15. Id. at 5 (second alteration in original) (quoting HOSEA EASTON, A TREATISE ON THE
INTELLECTUAL CHARACTER, AND CIVIL AND POLITICAL CONDITION OF THE COLORED PEOPLE
OF THE UNITED STATES; AND THE PREJUDICE EXERCISED TOWARDS THEM 40 (1837)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
16. LEE DANIELS’ THE BUTLER (The Weinstein Company 2013); see also Lee Daniels’ The
Butler Quotes: Clunky but Earnest, MOVIEQUOTESANDMORE.COM, http://www.moviequotesand
more.com/the-butler-quotes.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
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black cemetery in Detroit.17  Reverend Wendell Anthony explained,
“We are committed to ending hate—word and talk. It doesn’t do any-
one any good, whether it’s a journalist on TV or a rapper on the ra-
dio.”18  Likewise, the late poet Maya Angelou described the N-word
as “dangerous and vulgar” and took issue when the rapper Common
featured her reciting poetry on a track that also included the N-
word.19  Other members of the black community have discouraged use
of the N-word and blame rap music for popularizig it. During the infa-
mous O.J. Simpson trial, black prosecutor Christopher Darden de-
scribed the N-word as the “filthiest, dirtiest, nastiest word in the
English language.”20
Not surprisingly, the N-word has long been the subject of contro-
versy in locker rooms, classrooms, and courtrooms across America.  In
an April 22, 1947 game against the Philadelphia Phillies, Major
League Baseball’s first black player, Jackie Robinson, was asked,
“Hey, ni**er, why don’t you go back to the cotton field where you
belong?”21  Nearly thirty years later in 1973, black right fielder Hank
Aaron received increasingly vicious hate mail the closer he came to
breaking Babe Ruth’s home run record.22
Fast forward to November 2013, when black Los Angeles Clippers
player Matt Barnes tweeted about his black teammates: “I love my
teammates like family, but I’m DONE standing up for these
[ni**as]!”23  Although Mr. Barnes was criticized for his use of the N-
word, former NBA player Charles Barkley came to his defense on
national television, remarking “I use the N-word. I’m going to con-
tinue to use the N-word . . . . White America don’t [sic] get to dictate
how me and Shaq talk to each other.”24
From the basketball court to the classroom, the N-word has sparked
controversy.  In 2011, a University of Connecticut student filed a com-
plaint against a teaching assistant who used the N-word during an an-
17. Nadra Kareem Nittle, Famous Blacks Who’ve Spoken Out Against the N-Word,
ABOUT.COM, http://racerelations.about.com/od/diversitymatters/a/Black-Public-Figures-Who-Ve-
Spoken-Out-Against-The-N-Word.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 108.
21. Id. at 19.
22. Id. at 24–25.  One letter stated, “Dear Mr. Nigger, I hope you don’t break the Babe’s
record. How can I tell my kids that a nigger did it?” Id. at 24.
23. Cindy Boren, Matt Barnes Apologizes for Tweet About Clippers Teammates (Updated),
WASH. POST EARLY LEAD (Nov. 14, 2013, 8:44 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
early-lead/wp/2013/11/14/matt-barnes-tweets-n-word-in-frustration-with-clippers/.
24. BARKLEY BROADCAST, supra note 5; see also Billy Haisley, supra note 5.  “Shaq” refers to
former NBA player Shaquille O’Neal.
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thropology lesson examining the demeaning effect of a racial slur.25
That same year, an Alabama publishing company feared controversy
when it decided to substitute “slave” for the N-word in Mark Twain’s
classic, Huckleberry Finn.26  Perhaps “[t]he omnipresence of race-
based attitudes and experiences in the lives of black Americans causes
even nonviolent events to be interpreted as degrading, threatening,
and offensive.”27
The N-word has also long been the subject of legal controversy. The
first recorded use of the N-word in a legal proceeding occurred in
Blywe v. United States, an 1871 case involving two white men accused
of murdering several members of a black family.28  During a 1932 trial
in Atlanta, Georgia, a hostile witness used the N-word to refer to a
young black defendant.29  When his black defense attorney asked the
white judge to intervene because the N-word was “objectionable, prej-
udicial, and insulting,” the judge responded, “I don’t know whether it
is or not. . . . However, I’ll instruct the witness to call [the defendant]
‘darky,’ which is a term of endearment.”30
Times may have changed, but the meaning often associated with the
N-word has not.  In Spriggs v. Diamond Autoglass, the Fourth Circuit
characterized the N-word as “pure anathema to African Ameri-
cans.”31  As of July 2001, the racial slur “kike” appeared in 84 cases,
“wetback” in 50, “gook” in 90, “honky” in 286, and “nigger” in
4,219.32  As of February 2014, the racial slur “kike” appeared in 105
federal cases, “wetback” in 334, “gook” in 113, “honky” in 105, and
“nigger” in 5,162.33  Perhaps nowhere has use of the N-word been
more hotly debated than in the context of race-based hostile work
environment claims involving use of the N-word at the workplace.
25. Purbita Saha, T.A. Defends Use of N-Word in Class, DAILY CAMPUS (Apr. 25, 2011), http:/
/www.dailycampus.com/news/t-a-defends-use-of-n-word-in-class-1.2206419#.UwzXQP1RZBU.
26. Marc Schultz, Upcoming NewSouth “Huck Finn” Eliminates the “N” Word, PUBLISHERS
WKLY., Jan. 3, 2011, at 6, available at http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-
news/publisher-news/article/45645-upcoming-newsouth-huck-finn-eliminates-the-n-word.html.
The original manuscript reportedly uses the N-word an astonishing 219 times. Id. at 8.
27. Harris v. Int’l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1516, vacated in part, 765 F. Supp. 1529,
1530–32 (D. Me. 1991).
28. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 33.
29. Id. at 17.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 98 (quoting Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 2001)).
32. Id. at 32.
33. Westlaw searches performed on February 16, 2014.
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B.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits a cov-
ered employer from discriminating against a covered employee or ap-
plicant with respect to the “compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment” because of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.34  Congress intended Title VII to “strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment . . . in employment.”35
To prevail in a racially hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the harassing conduct (1) occurred because of
race; (2) was unwelcome; (3) was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the terms and conditions of employment or to create an abusive
work environment; and (4) would have been considered objectively
hostile by a reasonable person.36  A court will also consider the total-
ity of the circumstances in determining whether the conduct at issue
constitutes harassment.37  By way of illustration, a plaintiff might al-
lege that her supervisor often referred to her as the N-word, that co-
workers frequently circulated racist jokes at the workplace, and that
her complaints about the aforementioned behavior elicited no
response.
Rogers v. EEOC appears to be the first case to recognize a cause of
action based upon a racially hostile work environment.38  There, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a His-
panic complainant can establish a Title VII violation by demonstrating
that her employer created a hostile work environment for employees
by giving discriminatory service to Hispanic clientele.39  The Fifth Cir-
cuit determined that Title VII includes “within its protective ambit the
practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with eth-
nic or racial discrimination.”40  However, it cautioned that “mere ut-
terance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).  Title VII defines an “employer” as “a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each
of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of
such a person,” with certain exclusions. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(a).
35. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).  The harassment need not implicate
economic benefits such as termination. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.  In determining severity, an
isolated incident may be sufficient if it is egregious.  Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 788 (1998).
37. Id. at 787–88.
38. 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (as of August 2014).
39. Id. at 236–38.
40. Id. at 238.
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feelings in an employee” is insufficient to prevail in a claim because
Title VII does not create a general civility code for the workplace.41
The Fifth Circuit may have had the first word on what constitutes a
racially hostile work environment, but it certainly did not have the
last.  In 2013, courts in New York and Alabama upheld jury verdicts in
favor of black employees who claimed that their black supervisors’
use of the N-word at the workplace created a racially hostile work
environment.42  As will be discussed in more detail below, these out-
comes are correct because they comport with well-settled employment
discrimination law recognizing the realities of in-group discrimination,
account for the effects of implicit race bias, and promote fairness, con-
sistency, and judicial efficiency.
1.  Johnson v. Strive
On June 7, 2012, former Affiliate Services Coordinator Brandi
Johnson, a black female, filed a complaint in the Southern District of
New York against her New York City-based nonprofit employer,
Strive East Harlem Employment Group (Strive), an employment
agency, and against three of her former supervisors: Chief Operating
Officer and Chief Financial Officer Lisa Stein, a white female; Phil
Weinberg, a white male; and Strive’s founder, Rob Carmona.43  Al-
though Ms. Johnson described Mr. Carmona as Hispanic-American,
Mr. Carmona self-identified as a “black man of Latino descent.”44
Ms. Johnson alleged, inter alia, hostile work environment harassment,
discrimination, and retaliation on the basis of race and sex under Title
VII, Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the New York
City Human Rights Law.45
41. Id.
42. See Johnson v. Strive E. Harlem Emp’t Grp., 990 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Weath-
erly v. Ala. State Univ., 728 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2013).
43. Complaint at 1–3, Johnson v. Strive E. Harlem Emp’t Grp., 990 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y.
2014); Chris Opfer, NYC Jury Awards $280,000 to Black Worker Based on Hispanic Boss’s N-
Word Insults, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Sept. 4, 2013, at A-15.
44. Johnson, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 441 (describing Mr. Carmona as “a dark-skinned Puerto Rican
male”); Trial Transcript at 376:13–15, Johnson v. Strive E. Harlem Emp’t Grp., 990 F. Supp. 2d
435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Complaint, supra note 43, at 3.
45. Complaint, supra note 43, at 1, 9–10.  Ms. Johnson originally brought claims under Title
VII but filed an amended complaint omitting those claims after realizing that she had failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies as required by statute.  Given the focus of our article, we
largely omit discussion of Ms. Johnson’s related claims of retaliation, punitive damages, and sex
discrimination. Id. at 16–17.
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Ms. Johnson’s race discrimination claims arose primarily from the
following March 14, 2012 conversation46 between her and Mr.
Carmona:
Mr. Carmona: [Y]ou [(Johnson)] and her [(another black female)]
are just alike. . . . [B]oth smart, but both of y’all are really
knuckleheads. . . . Smart as shit, but dumb as shit . . . . [Y]ou know
what it is? Both of you are ni**ers. . . . [A]nd I’m not . . . using the
term “ni**er” derogatory [sic], ’cause sometimes it’s good to know
when to act like a ni**er.  But y’all act like ni**ers all the time.
Ms. Johnson: I am really offended by that. I don’t think that I
do. . . . I don’t believe I do. I think, in my time here, I have grown.
***
Mr. Carmona: Brandi, you and her act like ni**ers.  And ni**ers let
their feelings rule them. . . . Both of you are very bright . . . if you
ever got a hold of your brightness, in a substantive way, you’d go to
the top. . . . But y’all act like ni**ers. . . .
Ms. Johnson: Well, for the record, I beg to differ. But I’m ’a [sic]
leave it alone.
***
Ms. Johnson: But, for me, honestly, I would appreciate, next time,
pull me into the office and tell me that.  Don’t tell me that in front
of people, ’cause I—I was very offended [when you said in front of
other people] “Y’all are just alike.” Rob, I’m—I don’t think I’m like
her.
***
Mr. Carmona: And—and, uh, why is it—why are you making such a
big deal about it?
Ms. Johnson: Because . . . I’m trying my best to—to improve on
me. . . . [A]nd I don’t want to be constantly compared to somebody
who is not improving on them.  Honestly.
***
Mr. Carmona: Both very bright, but both of y’all act like ni**ers at
inappropriate times.
Ms. Johnson: I disagree, but okay.47
Ms. Johnson testified that as a result of Mr. Carmona’s remarks, she
felt “offended,” “degraded,” “disrespected,” and “embarrassed.”48
She further claimed that no actions were taken in response to her
complaints about Mr. Carmona’s behavior.49
46. Johnson, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 441–42.
47. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Post-Trial Motions at 4–5, Johnson v.
Strive E. Harlem Emp’t Grp., 990 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter Defendants’
Post-Trial Motions].
48. Trial Transcript, supra note 44, at 65:18–21.
49. Complaint, supra note 43, at 6.  Trial testimony indicated that Mr. Carmona yelled at and
directed foul language toward members of both sexes and all races.  Trial Transcript, supra note
47, at 50:13–23, 231:10–13, 236:13–37:15, 387:7–388:3, 457:20–21, 488:14–23; Defendants’ Post-
Trial Motions, supra note 47, at 4.
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Ms. Johnson sued, and four days later, Strive terminated her.50 A
five-day trial commenced on August 26, 2013.51  The jury concluded
that Mr. Carmona’s behavior created a hostile work environment and
that Strive terminated Ms. Johnson in retaliation for complaining
about Mr. Carmona’s behavior.52
Notably, the jury reached this conclusion even though Mr. Carmona
self-identified as a black male of Latino descent and claimed that he
was not using the N-word in a derogatory way.53  The defendants em-
phasized that the March 2012 conversation was the only time Mr. Car-
mona referred to Ms. Johnson as the N-word, and that she had not
heard him use that word to refer to anyone else.54  Furthermore, al-
though Ms. Johnson did not recall using the N-word at the office,55 at
least some witness testimony indicated that Ms. Johnson did use the
N-word in everyday conversation, albeit not at work.56  Furthermore,
Mr. Carmona stated during the conversation that he did not intend
50. Amended Complaint at 8, Johnson v. Strive E. Harlem Emp’t Grp., 990 F. Supp. 2d 45
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).  Ms. Johnson claimed that her termination resulted from retaliation, id., but the
defendants argued that she was terminated because her position was fully funded by a grant that
was expiring.  Defendants’ Post-Trial Motions, supra note 47, at 7 (citing Trial Transcript, supra
note 44, at 73:16–18, 134:16–21, 354:10–13, 486:6–13).
51. Johnson, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 441.
52. Id. at 443; see also Opfer, supra note 43, at A-15.  The jury reached this conclusion despite
the defendants’ contentions that neither Mr. Weinberg nor Ms. Stein subjected Ms. Johnson to
discrimination, Mr. Weinberg decided to terminate Ms. Johnson without Mr. Carmona’s influ-
ence, and Mr. Carmona did not make discriminatory remarks relating to Ms. Johnson’s termina-
tion.  Trial Transcript, supra note 44, at 404:13–16, 506:21–508:8; Defendants’ Post Trial-Motions,
supra note 47, at 11 & n.18.  The defendants also emphasized that Mr. Carmona assisted in hiring
Ms. Johnson; thus, the same-actor inference cuts against a finding of race discrimination.  De-
fendants’ Post-Trial Motions, supra note 47, at 11 n.18.  The defendants further claimed that the
“evidence demonstrated that Mr. Carmona engaged in such behavior towards individuals of all
races.” Id. at 13 (citing Trial Transcript, supra note 44, at 50:19, 387:7–388:3, 488:14–23).  How-
ever, the plaintiff’s counsel countered that Ms. Johnson, Ms. Stein, and Mr. Carmona testified to
Mr. Carmona’s influence and power to hire, fire, and discipline Ms. Johnson.  Memorandum of
Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Post Trial Motions at 5, Johnson v. Strive E. Harlem Emp’t
Grp., 990 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Opposition] (citing
Trial Transcript, supra note 44, at 95:7–8, 234:2–19, 315:2–14). According to Ms. Johnson, “Ms.
Stein testified extensively about ‘considering’ whether to terminate Plaintiff and indicating that
it was Mr. Carmona who ‘saved’ Ms. Johnson’s job.” Id. at 5 n.1 (citing Trial Transcript, supra
note 44, at 315:5–14).
53. Trial Transcript, supra note 44, at 376:13–15; Complaint, supra note 43, at 3; Defendants’
Post-Trial Motions, supra note 47, at 4.
54. Trial Transcript, supra note 44, at 67:5–9, 127:5–11; see also Defendants’ Post-Trial Mo-
tions, supra note 47, at 14.
55. Trial Transcript, supra note 44, at 92:20–93:24, 147:12–148:22.
56. Johnson, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 443; Trial Transcript, supra note 44, at 90:9–93:24,
147:12–148:22, 235:1–18, 399:13–18.
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the N-word to be demeaning.57  The defendants argued that Ms. John-
son’s reaction suggested that she was offended at her comparison to
another black female, Leticia Thomas, and not by Mr. Carmona’s use
of the N-word.58  After all, when Mr. Carmona asked Ms. Johnson
why she was “making such a big deal about it,” she responded, “I’m
trying my best . . . to improve on me. And . . . I don’t want to be
constantly compared to somebody who is not improving on them.
Honestly.”59  According to the defendants, Mr. Carmona’s isolated
use of the N-word was not sufficiently severe or pervasive,60 even
though Mr. Carmona admitted to using the N-word to describe Ms.
Johnson and Ms. Thomas in prior conversations with Ms. Thomas and
other employees.61  Ms. Johnson also contended that Mr. Carmona
made remarks about black women and their tendencies to “get in the
way of themselves.”62  In the end, the jury concluded that Mr. Car-
mona’s racial self-identification, his expressed intent in using the
word, and Ms. Johnson’s use of the word outside the workplace did
not excuse Mr. Carmona’s use of the N-word at the office in reference
to an employee.63
2. Weatherly v. Alabama State University
While jurors in New York were assessing Strive’s liability, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit grappled
with the same question: whether intraracial use of the N-word creates
a racially hostile work environment.  Despite the fact that New York
and Alabama could not be more culturally distinct, especially with re-
gard to each state’s historical stance on racial equality, both juries
reached the same conclusion: the same legal standard applies to inter-
racial and intraracial use of the N-word.64  Put differently, the mere
57. Trial Transcript, supra note 44, at 127:12–15; Defendants’ Post-Trial Motions, supra note
47, at 13 (“I’m not . . . using the term ‘ni**er’ derogatory [sic], ‘cause sometimes it’s good to
know when to act like a ni**er.”).
58. Defendants’ Post-Trial Motions, supra note 47, at 5.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 14 n.21 (citing Adam v. Glen Cove Sch., No. 06-CV-1200, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13039, at *37–42 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2008)); see also Dorrilus v. St. Rose’s Home, 234 F. Supp. 2d
326, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Francis v. Chem. Banking Corp., 62 F. Supp. 2d 948, 958–60 (E.D.N.Y.
1999).
61. Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Opposition, supra note 52, at 10 (citing Trial Transcript, supra note 44,
at 398:3–10).
62. Id.; see also Johnson v. Strive E. Harlem Emp’t Grp., 990 F. Supp. 2d 435, 442 (S.D.N.Y.
2014).
63. See Johnson, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 447 (holding, inter alia, that there was sufficient evidence
to support a jury verdict of race discrimination).
64. Id. at 446; Weatherly v. Ala. State Univ., 728 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 2013).
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fact that a supervisor self-identifies as black does not mean that her
use of the N-word in reference to black employees is lawful.
In Weatherly v. Alabama State University,65 a group of former em-
ployees—Jacqueline Weatherly, Lydia Burkhalter, and Cynthia Wil-
liams (collectively, the Employees)—sued Alabama State University
(ASU) in the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama,  al-
leging race and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.66  The Em-
ployees claimed that Dr. John Knight, Special Assistant to the
President, Acting President, Chief Operating Officer, and a member
of the state legislature, and LaVonette Bartley, ASU’s Associate Ex-
ecutive Director in the Office of the Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent, subjected them to discrimination, a hostile work environment,
and retaliation.67
According to Ms. Weatherly, Ms. Bartley regularly used the N-word
at the office, once even commenting that she was “sick and tired of
this ni**er shit.”68  Ms. Weatherly complained about Ms. Bartley’s re-
marks, but when Human Resources took no action, she transferred to
a different department.69  Ms. Bartley also allegedly directed terms,
such as “ni**er,” “ni**a,” “ni**a shit,” “fat bitch,” and “white bitch”
at Ms. Burkhalter, other coworkers, and even Ms. Burkhalther’s
seven-year-old son.70  Ms. Bartley also commented, “I’m sick of this
ni**a shit. These stupid bitches can’t do anything right. And they ain’t
nothing but some ni**as.”71  When Ms. Burkhalter’s complaints elic-
ited no response, she filed a charge with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) and was terminated shortly
thereafter.72  According to Ms. Williams, Ms. Bartley “consistently”
referred to her as a “ni**er” and “bitch” and made racially charged
comments, such as “talk to the ni**er side of the hand because the
white side does not want to hear it” and “we got to dress professional;
65. 728 F.3d at 1266–70.  Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court’s failure
to reraise the issue of severance sua sponte was not reviewable for abuse of discretion, that
denial of a motion to sever the Employees’ claims was not an abuse of discretion, that the Elev-
enth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to hear the defendant’s appeal of the district court’s denial of its
motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, that evidence established that the
employees attempted to mitigate damages as required to support an award of front pay, and that
the defendant waived its unclean hands claim. Id. at 1270–74.
66. Id. at 1266–68.
67. Id. at 1266.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1266–67.
70. Id. at 1267.
71. Weatherly, 728 F.3d at 1267.
72. Id. at 1267–68. ASU claimed that Ms. Burkhalter was fired for taking a sick day and
abandoning her job. Id. at 1268.
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we don’t dress like ni**ers.”73  Though Dr. Knight warned Ms. Wil-
liams not to speak to the EEOC regarding any discrimination allega-
tions, she complained about Ms. Bartley’s conduct, and ASU
terminated her.74
The Employees sued ASU on March 4, 2010, alleging, inter alia, a
racially hostile work environment.75 After the district court denied
ASU’s motion to sever the Employees’ claims, a consolidated trial
commenced on February 8, 2012.76 ASU moved for judgment as a
matter of law as to each claim but was denied.77 Among other things,
the jury concluded that the Employees had experienced a race-based
hostile work environment.78  The district court entered final judgment
on May 25, 2012, awarding over $1 million in damages.79  ASU ap-
pealed, but the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.80
The outcomes in Johnson and Weatherly may surprise members of
the black community who consider intraracial use of the N-word ac-
ceptable and even empowering, but as discussed in more detail below,
the conclusions in both cases are entirely consistent with the spirit and
purpose of Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes, which have
long recognized in-group discrimination.
C.  In-Group Discrimination
It is well settled that members of a protected group can discriminate
against other members of the same group.  In Castaneda v. Partida,
the Supreme Court of the United States concluded that a prima facie
showing of discrimination against Mexican-Americans in a county’s
grand jury selection could not be rebutted merely by showing that
Mexican-Americans held a “governing majority” of elective offices in
the county.81  According to Justice Harry Blackmun, “Because of the
many facets of human motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a
matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not dis-
criminate against other members of their group.”82  Furthermore, in
his concurring opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall rejected the as-
sumption that
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1268.  Ms. Williams made at least two other unsuccessful attempts to complain. Id.
75. Id. at 1268.
76. Id. at 1268–69.
77. Weatherly, 728 F.3d at 1269.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1269, 1274.
81. 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977).
82. Id.
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all members of all minority groups[ ] have an “inclination to assure
fairness” to other members of their group. . . . [Such] assumptions
about human nature, plausible as they may sound, fly in the face of
a great deal of social science theory and research. Social scientists
agree that members of minority groups frequently respond to dis-
crimination and prejudice by attempting to disassociate themselves
from the group, even to the point of adopting the majority’s nega-
tive attitudes towards the minority. Such behavior occurs with par-
ticular frequency among members of minority groups who have
achieved some measure of economic or political success and thereby
have gained some acceptability among the dominant group.83
The Supreme Court subsequently extended this reasoning to the
employment discrimination context.  In Oncale v. Sundowner Off-
shore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court held that same-sex sexual har-
assment is actionable under Title VII.84  There, Joseph Oncale worked
as a roustabout on an oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico.85  Several
members of Mr. Oncale’s eight-man crew subjected him to sex-related
insults and actions, including insinuations that he was a homosexual,
physical assaults, and threats of rape.86  When Sundowner ignored Mr.
Oncale’s complaints, he resigned, requesting that his pink slip indicate
he “voluntarily left due to sexual harassment and verbal abuse.”87  Mr.
Oncale sued Sundowner in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, but the district court held that his claim was not
actionable because he and his alleged harassers were members of the
same sex.88  The Fifth Circuit affirmed.89
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that same-sex sexual harass-
ment is actionable even when the harassing conduct occurs between
members of the same sex and is not motivated by sexual desire.90  The
Supreme Court observed that Title VII prohibits discrimination “be-
cause of sex” and rejected a “conclusive presumption that an em-
ployer will not discriminate against members of his own race.”91  The
Supreme Court did not observe anything in Title VII’s plain language
or in any precedent interpreting it that would support a categorical
exclusion of in-group harassment.92 Although same-sex sexual harass-
ment was “not the principal evil” that prompted Title VII’s enact-
83. Id. at 503 (Marshall, J., concurring).
84. 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
85. Id. at 76–77.
86. Id. at 77.
87. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79–80.
91. Id. at 78 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977)).
92. Id. at 79.
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ment, statutes often stretch “beyond the principal evil to cover
reasonably comparable evils.”93 The Supreme Court did not fear that
recognizing same-sex harassment would open the floodgates to Title
VII litigation or transform Title VII into an onerous civility code.94
The outcomes in Johnson and Weatherly are consistent with the
longstanding recognition of in-group discrimination, because in both
cases, the juries refused to presume that the supervisor did not harass
or discriminate against the employee or employees on the basis of
race merely because the supervisor and the employee or employees
were both black.95  In other words, there is no legal presumption that
intraracial use of the N-word is insufficient to create a racially hostile
work environment.
D.  Third-Party Associative Discrimination
The outcomes in Johnson and Weatherly also comport with prece-
dent acknowledging the evils of third-party associative discrimination.
Third-party associative discrimination occurs when an individual is
discriminated against because of her association with another group or
individual, specifically those protected under Title VII.96  In other
words, a person is discriminated against not because of the group to
which she belongs, but rather because of her association with a pro-
tected group or its members.
A plaintiff alleging third-party associative discrimination must es-
tablish that the discrimination resulted from her association with a
member of a protected group.  By way of illustration, consider the
following:  John Doe is a white male who is married to Jane, a black
female. John applies for a job at XYZ Corporation (XYZ) for which
he is well qualified.  However, the interviewer at XYZ who has hiring
and firing authority denies John the position because the interviewer
does not approve of John’s interracial marriage. John sues XYZ under
Title VII for unlawful failure to hire because of race.  Although XYZ
did not discriminate against John because of his race, it did discrimi-
nate against him because of his interracial romantic association with
93. Id.
94. Id. at 80.
95. Johnson v. Strive E. Harlem Emp’t Grp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 435, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Weath-
erly v. Ala. State Univ., 728 F.3d 1263, 1266 (11th Cir. 2013).
96. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012); see also
Mark W. Honeycutt II & Van D. Turner, Jr., Comment, Third-Party Associative Discrimination
Under Title VII, 68 TENN. L. REV. 913, 913 (2001).  Historically, nonblacks who associated with
or assisted blacks, such as Freedom Riders, had a common label of their own:  “ni**er lovers.”
KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 25–26.
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Jane, a black female.  In this scenario, John has been a victim of third-
party associative discrimination.
A plaintiff alleging third-party associative discrimination may have
difficulty establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Some
courts have denied third-party associative discrimination claims for
lack of standing because one could argue that the discrimination is
based on the race of a third party—here, Jane—rather than the race of
the plaintiff.97  These courts reason that permitting third-party as-
sociative discrimination claims contravenes the plain language of Title
VII, which prohibits discrimination because of “such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin,” not that of a third party.98  The
minority approach rigidly adheres to a strict interpretation of Title VII
without considering that a broader interpretation may better effectu-
ate the statute’s spirit and purpose.99
However, most courts do recognize that while the statutory lan-
guage of Title VII does not explicitly prohibit third-party associative
discrimination, denying such claims for lack of standing contravenes
the law’s spirit and purpose—that is, deterring discrimination and cre-
ating equal employment opportunities for protected groups.100  As the
Fifth Circuit explained in Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co.,
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides us with a clear man-
date from Congress that no longer will the United States tolerate
this form of discrimination. It is, therefore, the duty of the courts to
make sure that the Act works, and the intent of Congress is not
hampered by a combination of a strict construction of the statute
and a battle with semantics.101
The Eleventh Circuit elaborated on this reasoning in Parr v. Wood-
men of the World Life Insurance Co., a case involving an otherwise
qualified white male who was purportedly denied employment be-
cause of his marriage to a black woman.102  There, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit explained that when a plaintiff alleges that she has been
discriminated against because of a third-party association, she is, by
97. Honeycutt & Turner, supra note 96, at 919–20 (citing Ripp v. Dobbs House, Inc., 366 F.
Supp. 205, 208–09 (N.D. Ala. 1973)); see also Adams v. Governor’s Comm. on Postsecondary
Educ., No. C80-624A, 1981 WL 27101, at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3, 1981); Honeycutt & Turner,
supra note 96, at 921 (noting the defendants’ unsuccessful argument that the white plaintiff did
not have standing under a theory of third-party associative discrimination in Whitney v. Greater
N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
98. Honeycutt & Turner, supra note 96, at 915–16 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994)).
99. Id. at 914.
100. Id. at 916.
101. 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970).
102. 791 F.2d 888, 889 (11th Cir. 1986).
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definition, alleging that she has been discriminated against because of
race, and she need not specify that in her complaint.103
Other circuits have followed suit, prohibiting discrimination result-
ing from interracial romantic associations.  In Deffenbaugh-Williams
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a white female sued Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
(Walmart), alleging discrimination due to her romantic relationship
with a black male employee.104  The Fifth Circuit concluded that
Walmart discriminated against the plaintiff “because of [her] race
(white)” due to her interracial relationship, and that Title VII prohib-
its such discrimination.105  It further determined that Walmart’s prof-
fered reason for terminating the plaintiff—that she “shopped the
clock”—was a mere pretext for discriminating on the basis of her in-
terracial relationship.106  Likewise, in Ross v. Douglas County, a black
prison guard successfully sued his employer after his black supervisor
called him the N-word and “black boy” and referred to his white wife
as “whitey.”107  The court rejected the defendant’s argument that, as a
matter of law, a black person could not subject another black person
to a racially hostile work environment, relying on Justice Thurgood
Marshall’s conclusion in Castaneda that “it would be unwise to pre-
sume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will
not discriminate against other members of their group.”108
In Ellis v. United Parcel Service, Inc., a black employee alleged that
a black female supervisor had discriminated against him because he
dated and subsequently married a white coworker.109  The Employee
Relations Manager, a black female, purportedly made multiple nega-
tive remarks about the plaintiff’s interracial relationship to the plain-
tiff and his direct supervisor, who was also a black female.110  The
Seventh Circuit neither presumed that a black supervisor would not
discriminate against a fellow black person because of race, nor con-
cluded that an employer cannot be held liable for Title VII discrimina-
tion when it discriminates against an employee because the employee
is involved in an interracial romantic relationship.  Instead, the court
held that Ellis did not demonstrate that he was treated worse than
103. Id. at 892.
104. 156 F.3d 581, 586 (5th Cir. 1998).
105. Id. at 588–89 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id. at 590–91.
107. 234 F.3d 391, 393 (8th Cir. 2000).
108. Id. at 396 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977)).
109. 523 F.3d 823, 824–25 (7th Cir. 2008).
110. Id. at 824–25.
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similarly situated employees who violated the nonfraternization policy
and were subject to the same decision maker.111
Several federal appellate courts, including the Second, Third, and
Sixth Circuits, have even extended protection to nonromantic interra-
cial associations.  For example, in DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., a
white male alleged that he was forced to retire early because he sold
his home to a black person.112  The Second Circuit held that the plain-
tiff had standing to sue because he had been discriminated against for
“vindicating the right of a black fellow-employee ‘to make . . . [a] con-
tract . . .’ similar to that which whites in the neighborhood have freely
been able to make.”113  Likewise, in Sperling v. United States,114 a
white union grievance representative claimed that the U.S. Army de-
nied him a promotion because he successfully represented a black em-
ployee.115  In denying the government’s motion to dismiss, the court
concluded that Title VII should not be so narrowly construed as to
preclude Mr. Sperling’s claim simply because the discrimination re-
sulted from his association with a black man, rather than from Mr.
Sperling’s own race.116
In sum, the outcomes in Johnson and Weatherly are consistent with
the longstanding recognition of third-party associative discrimination.
This legal doctrine underscores that in the employment context, indi-
viduals of the same racial background may be on opposite ends of
racial discrimination in the employment setting—one discriminating
and the other being the victim of discrimination.
E.  Selecting the Proper Standard
A workplace “permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridi-
cule, and insult’” sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condi-
tions of the victim’s employment can create a hostile work
111. Id. at 826–28.
112. 511 F.2d 306, 307, 309 (2d Cir. 1975) (involving a § 1981 claim of third-party associative
discrimination).
113. Id. at 312 (alteration in original) (citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 237
(1969)) (holding that “a white person who has been ‘punished for trying to vindicate the rights of
(non-white) minorities . . .’ has standing to sue”).
114. 515 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1975).
115. Id. at 467–68 (“Sperling claims that he was denied a promotion to a GS-13 position in
November, 1968, in retaliation for his successful representation, as union grievance delegate, of
the black . . . employee.”).
116. Id. at 484.  Title VII also prohibits covered employers from retaliating against an appli-
cant or employee with respect to any aspect of employment because the individual filed an
EEOC Charge, complained of discrimination to the employer, or participated in an employment
discrimination proceeding, such as an EEOC investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).
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environment.117  To prevail on a racially hostile work environment
claim, the plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that a “reasonable per-
son” would have found the conduct “hostile or abusive.”118  The Mer-
riam-Webster Dictionary describes the N-word as “perhaps the most
offensive and inflammatory racial slur” in the English language.119  It
is no surprise that given the N-word’s dark history, many, if not most,
courts have concluded that a reasonable person of any race would find
its use at the workplace objectionable.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that in
the context of a hostile environment claim, the objective severity of
harassment is determined from the perspective of a “reasonable per-
son.”120  For example, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, the Supreme
Court observed that “[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough
to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an en-
vironment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is
beyond Title VII’s purview.”121  The Supreme Court further outlined
a nonexhaustive list of factors, such as the frequency of the discrimina-
tory conduct, that could be examined to determine the severity and
pervasiveness of the conduct.  Significantly, that list omits the race of
the speaker, instead focusing exclusively on the experience and per-
spective of the target of the speech.122
Naturally, some lower courts have relied on the Supreme Court’s
use of the “reasonable person standard” to explicitly reject the view
that the objective severity of the harassment should be determined
from the perspective of a particular group, e.g., a “reasonable African-
American” or a “reasonable Jew.”123  As the Second Circuit has
explained:
Title VII seeks to protect those that are the targets of such conduct,
and it is their perspective, not that of bystanders or the speaker, that
is pertinent. Second, this standard makes clear that triers of fact are
not to determine whether some ethnic or gender groups are more
117. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (affirming the standard articulated in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1986)).
118. Id. at 21.
119. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 133–35.
120. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; see also Meritor, 477 U.S. 57.
121. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 23 (discussing the frequency of the conduct, its severity, whether it was physically
threatening or humiliating, whether it reasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work, and what
psychological harm, if any, it caused).
123. Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 436 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted) (“Richardson’s allegations should thus be evaluated to determine whether a
reasonable person who is the target of discrimination would find the working conditions so se-
vere or pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of employment for the worse.”), abrogated
on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
84 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:65
thin-skinned than others. Such an inquiry would at best concern
largely indeterminate and fluid matters varying according to loca-
tion, time, and current events. It might also lead to evidence, argu-
ment, and deliberations regarding supposed group characteristics
and to undesirable, even ugly, jury and courtroom scenes.124
Taken together, this well-settled precedent suggests that whether a
hostile environment exists hinges on the experience of the target of
the speech, not the race or perspective of the speaker.  The longstand-
ing recognition that the reasonable person standard is the proper basis
for determining whether unwelcome conduct is sufficiently pervasive
and severe to create a hostile work environment also provides addi-
tional support for the assertion that Johnson and Weatherly were cor-
rectly decided.125  After all, the shameful historical legacy of the N-
word underscores the extent to which a reasonable person of any race
would likely object to its use at the workplace, even if the speaker is
black.
Despite its relatively innocent origin, the N-word had become a
common racial slur by the nineteenth century.126  To persons of all
races, the N-word evokes a history of racial violence, brutality, and
subordination.  Times may have changed, but to many Americans, the
negative connotation of the N-word has not.  For example, to media
mogul Oprah Winfrey, the N-word still evokes images of racially moti-
vated lynchings.127  In The Butler, a black character describes the N-
word as “a white man’s word . . . filled with hate.”128  As mentioned
earlier, the NAACP literally buried the N-word at a historically black
cemetery to symbolize the NAACP’s commitment to end hate.129
Prominent members of the black community, including the late Maya
Angelou, have publicly criticized use of the N-word and decried it as a
racial slur.130  Even nonblacks immersed in black culture (i.e., rap art-
ists, spoken word artists, and racialized comedians) rarely use the
word.131  Indeed, the N-word is such a powerful insult that its reach
124. Id. at 436 n.3.
125. See Delph v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Paragould, Inc., 130 F.3d 349, 357 (8th Cir. 1997)
(requiring plaintiff to show that he was “subjected to a racially hostile workplace environment a
reasonable person would find intolerable, and that he did find it intolerable”).
126. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 4–5.
127. Jay-Z Video, supra note 12.
128. LEE DANIELS’ THE BUTLER, supra note 16;  see also Lee Daniels’ The Butler Quotes,
supra note 16.
129. Nittle, supra note 17.
130. Id.
131. Gregory S. Parks & Shayne E. Jones, “Nigger”: A Critical Race Realist Analysis of the N-
Word Within Hate Crimes Law, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1305, 1306, 1310, 1321 (2008).
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has spread beyond the black community to become a tool to denigrate
other racial and ethnic groups at home and abroad.132
The N-word has been described as “the most offensive and inflam-
matory racial slur in English, . . . a word expressive of racial hatred
and bigotry,”133 and countless judicial opinions reflect this view.134  In
Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Company, the Seventh
Circuit opined that “no single act can more quickly alter the condi-
tions of employment and create an abusive working environment than
the use of an unambiguously racial epithet such as ‘[ni**er]’ by a su-
pervisor in the presence of his subordinates.”135  Likewise, in
McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., the Ninth Circuit concluded that use
of the N-word in reference to a black employee and the prevalence of
racially charged graffiti at the workplace were “significant exacerbat-
ing factors in evaluating the severity of the racial hostility.”136
To many individuals both inside and outside the black community,
use of the N-word is debasing. It is like the age-old joke: “What do
you call a black man with a Ph.D.?”  The response being: “a
ni**er,”137 which reflects how dehumanizing and reductionist the
word can be.  Not surprisingly, the Honorable Andre M. Davis of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit penned a 2008
opinion piece in the Baltimore Sun to a man who called him a
“ni**er” while he was a federal district court judge.138  After being
called the N-word by a pedestrian, Judge Davis wrote, “[Y]ou gave me
a quite unexpected but not altogether unforeseeable flashback.  In the
shared journey of Americans to attain a society marked by mutual
respect for the differences among us, one needn’t travel far to be re-
minded how far we have to travel.”139
Outside the employment discrimination context, plaintiffs have ar-
gued that use of the N-word is outrageous conduct sufficient to inten-
tionally inflict emotional distress, and that its use by an attorney or
132. See KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 27 (noting that Arabs are often labeled “sand ni**ers”
while the Irish are called the “ni**ers” of Europe).
133. Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 817 (9th Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
134. See, e.g., id.; NLRB v. Foundry Div. of Alcon Indus., Inc., 260 F.3d 631, 635 n.5 (6th Cir.
2001) (“That the word ‘[ni**er]’ is a slur is not debatable.”).
135. 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
136. 360 F.3d 1103, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004).
137. Alfredo Mirande´, Alfredo’s Caribbean Adventure: LatCrit Theory, Narratives, and the
Politics of Exclusion, 26 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 207, 235 (2006).
138. Andre M. Davis, Op-Ed, To the Man Who Called Me N-Word, BALT. SUN, May 9, 2008,
at 27A.
139. Id.
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juror, standing alone, is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial.140
They have also argued that the word’s use is so offensive that a target
of the N-word who kills the speaker should have a count of first-de-
gree murder reduced to second-degree murder on grounds of provo-
cation.141  Not surprisingly, many Americans of all races find the N-
word patently offensive and inappropriate in virtually any setting, es-
pecially in the workplace.142  Some have even pushed to abolish the
word from the English language.143
Despite guidance from the Supreme Court providing that objective
severity should be determined from the perspective of a reasonable
person in the plaintiff’s position, some courts have considered a stan-
dard that takes into account the plaintiff’s race, national origin, sex,
and other protected characteristics.144  For example, in Watkins v.
Bowden, a black female brought race- and sex-based hostile work en-
vironment claims against her previous employers, alleging that they
allowed conversations about African-American hair and sexuality at
the workplace.145   The plaintiff sought a jury instruction to determine
whether a “reasonable African American or woman” would have con-
sidered the work environment to be hostile.146 The district court con-
sidered her argument but ultimately denied her request, applying a
reasonable person standard instead.147
Likewise, in Richardson v. New York State Department of Correc-
tional Service, a black female sued her employer, alleging that she was
subject to a racially hostile environment in violation of Title VII.148
Coworkers allegedly referred to Ms. Richardson as the N-word, and
supervisors used the N-word in her presence.149  Like in Watkins, the
Second Circuit applied a reasonable person standard to determine the
objective severity of the harassment, reasoning that although the per-
spective of the target is pertinent to the evaluation and Title VII aims
to protect the target of offensive conduct, it is not the court’s duty to
140. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 58–59, 62, 64–67, 81–83, 106–07 (observing that although such
challenges are made, they are unlikely to prevail).
141. Id. at 72–73.
142. See id. at 127.
143. Id. at 137.
144. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1115 (9th Cir. 2004).
145. 105 F.3d 1344, 1346, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 1997).
146. Id. at 1355–56.
147. Id at 1356; see also Gillming v. Simmons Indus., 91 F.3d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir. 1996).
148. 180 F.3d 426, 432 (2d Cir. 1999).  The race of the employers and coworkers were not
disclosed in the case.
149. Id. at 439.
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determine whether some members of ethnic or other groups are more
impervious to insult than others.150
These rulings comport with Johnson and Weatherly because, in both
cases, the juries did not determine that a black supervisor’s use of the
N-word was acceptable merely because the supervisor spoke the
words from the perspective of a black person.  Nor did the juries de-
termine the objective severity of the harassment from the perspective
of a reasonable black person merely because the speakers and targets
of the speech were both black.  Instead, in both cases, the jurors ap-
plied a reasonable person standard to conclude that intraracial use of
the N-word created a racially hostile work environment in violation of
Title VII, regardless of the fact that the speaker and target were
black.151
Although most courts continue to apply a reasonable person stan-
dard when determining the objective severity of harassment in hostile
work environment cases, in 2004, the Ninth Circuit appeared to apply
a reasonable “African-American man” standard to deny summary
judgment in part in a case involving allegations of race discrimination
and a hostile work environment.152  In that case, George McGinest, a
black employee, sued GTE Service Corporation (GTE) under Title
VII for creation of a racially hostile work environment, failure to pro-
mote due to race, and retaliation.153  Among other things, Mr.
McGinest’s coordinator allegedly called Mr. McGinest a “stupid
ni**ger” and remarked that Mr. McGinest “should stay in Long
Beach . . . with your kind.”154  Another supervisor purportedly re-
marked, “The other colored guy who used to work here would jump
when I said it.”155  A coworker reportedly stated that she would retire
before she worked “for a [b]lack man.”156  Coworkers allegedly called
a white employee who was friends with black employees “Aunt Je-
mima” and “mammy,” but the employee who spoke the slurs charac-
terized them as “teasing nickname[s].”157  Graffiti, including the N-
150. Id. at 436 n.3.
151. Johnson v. Strive E. Harlem Emp’t Grp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 435, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2014);
Weatherly v. Ala. State Univ., 728 F.3d 1263, 1266 (11th Cir. 2013).
152. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1106–07, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004).  The court
affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s retaliation claim. Id. at 1125.
153. Id. at 1106.
154. Id. at 1109 (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Id. at 1109–10.
156. Id. at 1110 (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Id.; see also Jones v. City of Overland Park, Nos. 92–2163–KHV, 92–2162–KHV, 1994
WL 583153, at *2–3 (D. Kan. Aug. 15, 1994) (acknowledging that the “Aunt Jemima” remark is
relevant in determining the existence of a racially hostile environment).
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word and the phrase “white is right,” appeared on the walls of the
men’s restroom, and weeks passed before it was removed.158
In determining whether to grant GTE’s motion for summary judg-
ment, the court explained that “McGinest must show the existence of
a genuine factual dispute as to 1) whether a reasonable African-Amer-
ican man would find the workplace so objectively and subjectively ra-
cially hostile as to create an abusive working environment; and 2)
whether GTE failed to take adequate remedial and disciplinary ac-
tion.”159  Put differently, “allegations of a racially hostile workplace
must be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable person belong-
ing to the racial or ethnic group of the plaintiff.”160
Courts adopting a “reasonable black person” standard may rely on
Oncale to argue that the Supreme Court refashioned the “reasonable
person standard” articulated in Harris to take into account other rele-
vant factors including the victim’s ethnicity, sex, or race.161  Harris re-
ferred to “an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile
or abusive.”162   In Oncale, however, the Supreme Court stated that
“the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the per-
spective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering
‘all the circumstances.’”163  Some courts have construed “in the plain-
tiff’s position, considering all the circumstances” to permit use of a
customized standard based on the characteristics of the plaintiff, in-
cluding race.  Yet even that language does not definitively suggest that
the race of the target of the speaker should be dispositive in determin-
ing whether use of the N-word constitutes race discrimination, and
Oncale involved same-sex harassment, not race discrimination.
To justify this interpretation, some argue that racially motivated
comments or actions that seem innocent or minimally offensive to
someone outside the targeted group could be perceived as abusive
from the perspective of a plaintiff who is a member of the group.  In-
deed, “[t]he omnipresence of race-based attitudes and experiences in
the lives of black Americans [may cause] even nonviolent events to be
interpreted as degrading, threatening, and offensive.”164  Courts
158. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1110–11.
159. Id. at 1112 (citing Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1462–63 (9th Cir.
1994)) (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 1115.
161. See, e.g., id. at 1115 n.8.
162. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
163. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (emphasis added)
(quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).
164. Harris v. Int’l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1516 (noting that “instances of racial vio-
lence or threatened violence which might appear to white observers as mere ‘pranks’ are, to
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adopting the reasonable black person standard have also observed
that consideration of the existence and severity of discrimination from
the perspective of a reasonable person of the plaintiff’s race better
recognizes forms of discrimination that are real and hurtful but could
easily be missed if considered solely from the perspective of someone
of a different race than the plaintiff.165
Adoption of the reasonable black person standard is especially per-
tinent when one considers that some black individuals use the N-word
as a term of solidarity or affection.  According to Professor Clarence
Major, the N-word used by one black person to refer to another is a
“racial term with undertones of warmth and goodwill.”166  In a 2009
interview, black rapper Jay-Z explained, “People give words
power. . . . [O]ur generation  . . . took the power out of that word. We
turned a word that was very ugly and hurtful into a term of endear-
ment . . . .”167  Similarly, in Nigger in the Window, Helen Jackson Lee
observes that the N-word is a “piece-of-clay word that you could
shape . . . to express your feelings.”168  Professor Randall Kennedy
observes that blacks who use the N-word do not care if it makes mem-
bers of other races or even other blacks uncomfortable; rather, they
“care principally, perhaps exclusively, about what they themselves
think, desire, and enjoy.”169  According to author Bruce A. Jacobs,
“To proclaim oneself a [ni**er] is to declare to the disapproving main-
stream, ‘You can’t fire me. I quit.’ . . .  To growl that one is a [ni**a] is
a seductive gesture . . . that can feel bitterly empowering.”170  Perhaps
for this reason, Professor Mari Matsuda argues that to disallow in-
traracial use of the N-word further victimizes blacks by “misunder-
standing their linguistic and cultural norms.”171
Although these points are well taken, they do not justify application
of a different and certainly no less onerous standard in race-based
hostile environment cases arising from intraracial use of the N-word.
To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must also
black observers, evidence of threatening, pervasive attitudes”), vacated in part on other grounds,
765 F. Supp. 1529, 1532 (D. Me. 1991); see also id. (discussing “racial jokes, comments or nonvio-
lent conduct which white observers are . . . more likely to dismiss as non-threatening isolated
incidents”); Dickerson v. New Jersey, 767 F. Supp. 605, 616 (D.N.J. 1991) (“The mere mention of
the KKK invokes a long and violent history sufficient to detrimentally affect any reasonable
person of the same race as the plaintiff.”).
165. See, e.g., Harris, 765 F. Supp. at 1516.
166. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 36–37.
167. Jay-Z Video, supra note 12.
168. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 38.
169. Id. at 171.
170. Id. at 49.
171. Id. at 160.
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show that the conduct or speech was unwelcome and that she subjec-
tively perceived it as abusive.172  Concerns regarding whether the tar-
get of the speech was subjectively offended by the speech even though
it was intraracial are more properly addressed when assessing whether
the conduct was subjectively unwelcome, not when evaluating the ob-
jective severity of the alleged harassment.
Furthermore, although the Oncale Court stated that the “objective
severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a rea-
sonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the circum-
stances,’” it elaborated that in same-sex harassment cases, “all the
circumstances” means “consideration of the social context in which
particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target.”173  The
Oncale Court illustrated this point by observing that a football
player’s work environment differs substantially from that of a coach’s
secretary working in an office.174  Thus, while the coach smacking a
player’s buttocks as he enters the field might not rise to the level of a
Title VII violation, the same behavior toward the coach’s secretary
would certainly be inappropriate at the office.175  It is undisputed that
behavior and language that may be acceptable in rap lyrics, on the
field, or in the locker room may not always acceptable at the office.
As the Supreme Court explained:
The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and rela-
tionships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the
words used or the physical acts performed. Common sense, and an
appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and ju-
ries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among
members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in
the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.176
Notably, nowhere does the Court mention the race of the speaker nor
the target of the speech.  Nor did the Supreme Court explicitly include
race, sex, or ethnicity in the “constellation of surrounding
circumstances.”177
172. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 23 (1993).
173. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
174. Id.
175. Id. But see Tim Daniels, NFL Expected To Create 15-Yard Penalty for Use of Racial Slur,
BLEACHER REPORT (Feb. 22, 2014), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1970032-nfl-expected-to-
create-15-yard-penalty-for-use-of-racial-slur?utm_source=cnn.com&utm_medium=referral&utm
_campaign=editorial&hpt=hp_t2 (contemplating imposition of a fifteen-yard penalty for use of
racial slur during the game and complete ejection for subsequent use of a racial slur).
176. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82.
177. Id.
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To be clear, we do not suggest that courts should entirely ignore the
“constellation of surrounding circumstances” when assessing whether
a work environment is hostile.  To the contrary, appropriate sensitivity
to the social context of the alleged harassment will enable courts and
juries to recognize conduct that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s
position would find severely hostile or abusive.178  The inclusion of
details regarding the context of the speech, such as where and when
the alleged harassing marks were made, may ensure that a jury consid-
ers “whether the conduct would be offensive to a reasonable person in
the plaintiff’s position . . . and may help ensure that the jury view[s]
the conduct from the plaintiff’s perspective.”179  However, the stan-
dards controlling what might be acceptable in society at large do not
necessarily correspond to what is legally permissible in the
workplace.180
Infusion of race into assessments of the objective severity of race-
based harassment “may perpetuate negative stereotypes or insert into
the case prejudicial or inflammatory material that has no relevance to
the plaintiff’s experience.”181  However, “[t]he purpose of Title VII is
not to import into the workplace the prejudices of the community, but
through law to liberate the workplace from the demeaning influence
of discrimination, and thereby to implement the goals of human dig-
nity and economic equality in employment.”182
Finally, although white supremacists originally used the N-word to
denigrate blacks, evidence suggests that now some members of the
black community still use the word to insult members of their own
race.183  Thus, the word could still create a racially hostile work envi-
ronment even if judged from a reasonable black person’s perspective.
For example, a black person may refer to another black person as the
N-word to denote laziness, bad behavior, lack of intelligence, or other
negative traits.184  As a result, even this intraracial use connotes inferi-
ority, insult, and may cause offense.185  Given the N-word’s long and
178. Muzzy v. Cahillane Motors, Inc., 749 N.E.2d. 691, 695–96 (Mass. 2001) (quoting Oncale
and discussing the pros and cons of giving a reasonable person instruction in a specific context
that includes the plaintiff’s attributes).
179. Id. at 696.
180. Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632 n.7 (“What is, is not always what is right, and reasona-
ble people can take justifiable offense at comments that the vulgar among us, even if they are a
majority, would consider acceptable.”).
181. Muzzy, 749 N.E.2d at 696.
182. King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
183. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 45–46.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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negative history, it is unsurprising that a reasonable person of any race
could find its use at the workplace offensive.
F.  The Automaticity of Race Bias and Use of the N-Word
Conventional wisdom and even “naı¨ve” psychological conceptions
of human thought and social behavior186 place great weight on accessi-
ble thoughts and conscious intentions as informing expressly held be-
liefs and volitional behavior.187  An express belief is one that is
consciously endorsed, and a conscious intention to act exists when the
actor purposefully engages in behavior for some specific reason.188
The challenge to such an assessment is that it has long been known
that social influences operating within interview and research settings
can lead individuals to inaccurately describe their explicit beliefs.189
Furthermore, people’s explanations of their behavior sometimes con-
sist of a mere groping for answers, thus producing often improbable
answers.190
Contrary to the notion that human thoughts and behaviors are
purely accessible and volitional, the vast and growing body of research
on implicit social cognition suggests that individuals lack both abso-
lute awareness of their own thoughts and the ability to control behav-
iors that flow from those thoughts.  Such mental processes include
implicit memory,191 implicit perception,192 implicit attitudes,193 im-
186. Terence Horgan & James Woodward, Folk Psychology Is Here To Stay, in MIND AND
COGNITION: AN ANTHOLOGY 419 (William G. Lycan et al. eds., 2008).
187. Paulo Sousa, On Folk Conceptions of Mind, Agency, and Morality, 6 J. COGNITION &
CULTURE 1, 1 (2006).
188. Id. at 22.
189. Martin T. Orne, On the Social Psychology of the Psychological Experiment: With Particu-
lar Reference to Demand Characteristics and Their Implications, 17 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 776,
776–77 (1962); see also Stephen J. Weber & Thomas D. Cook, Subject Effects in Laboratory
Research: An Examination of Subject Roles, Demand Characteristics, and Valid Inference, 77
PSYCHOL. BULL. 273, 273–74 (1972).
190. Orne, supra note 189, at 778–79.
191. Daniel L. Schacter, Implicit Memory: History and Current Status, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 501, 501 (1987).
192. John F. Kihlstrom et al., Implicit Perception, in PERCEPTION WITHOUT AWARENESS: COG-
NITIVE, CLINICAL, AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 17, 19 (Robert F. Bornstein & Thane S. Pittman
eds., 1992).
193. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition:
The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464 (1998).
2014] THE NTH DECREE 93
plicit stereotypes,194 implicit self-esteem,195 and implicit self-
concept.196
Implicit memory research from the 1980s led to the development of
measures to assess other implicit mental phenomena, including im-
plicit attitudes and implicit stereotypes.  An attitude is a hypothetical
construct that represents the degree to which an individual likes or
dislikes or acts favorably or unfavorably toward someone or some-
thing.197  People may also be ambivalent about a person, a group of
people, or an object, such that they are imbued with both positive and
negative attitudes about the object in question.  Attitudes are implicit
when they lie outside of conscious awareness.  Professors Anthony G.
Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji define implicit attitudes as “intro-
spectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past expe-
rience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or
action toward social objects.”198  Implicit attitudes are of greatest in-
terest when they are different from explicit attitudes about the same
category of individuals or things. Such discrepancies, referred to as
“dissociations,” are often observed in attitudes toward stigmatized
groups, such as groups defined by age, disability, ethnicity, sex, relig-
ion, sexual orientation, and race.199
On the other hand, a social stereotype is a mental association made
between, for example, a social group and a trait.200  Such an associa-
tion may or may not be grounded in a statistical reality.  If the associa-
tion is grounded in empirical reality, group members who are the
subject of the mental association will be more likely to display the
associated trait than members of other groups.201  Implicitly, such ste-
reotypes are “the introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identi-
194. Laurie A. Rudman et al., Implicit Self-Concept and Evaluative Implicit Gender Stereo-
types: Self and Ingroup Share Desirable Traits, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1164,
1164 (2001).
195. Anthony G. Greenwald & Shelly D. Farnham, Using the Implicit Association Test To
Measure Self-Esteem and Self-Concept, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1022, 1022 (2000).
196. Rudman et al., supra note 194.  As used herein, “implicit” connotes a lack of explicit or
express access to memory, perception, attitudes, and the like.
197. See Alice H. Eagly & Shelly Chaiken, Attitude Structure and Function, in 1 THE HAND-
BOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 269, 269–71 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
198. Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-
Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 8 (1995).
199. Michael A. Olson & Russell H. Fazio, Implicit and Explicit Measures of Attitudes: The
Perspective of the MODE Model, in ATTITUDES: INSIGHTS FROM THE NEW IMPLICIT MEASURES
19, 19–64 (Richard E. Petty et al. eds., 2009).
200. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 949 (2006).
201. Id.
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fied) traces of past experience that mediate attributions of qualities to
members of a social category.”202
A bias reflects a preference for a particular group or category over
another group or category.  Accordingly, within biases, there are op-
posite sides to the same coin—favorable and unfavorable categoriza-
tions of comparative groups.  For example, in-group bias designates
favoritism toward one’s own group or groups.203  Not surprisingly, im-
plicit attitudes and stereotypes may result in discriminatory biases.204
These biases are called “implicit biases,” which may diverge from an
individual’s express beliefs and result in behavior inconsistent with the
individual’s intended behavior.
Within the social and behavioral sciences, the typical method of at-
titude measurement has been the collection of self-reports, which re-
flect an individual’s explicit attitudes.  For example, when researchers
want to ascertain subjects’ attitudes toward something, they usually
ask participants to select one of several given responses, or to com-
plete a rating scale.205  The drawback in using these methods is that
some respondents may be unwilling or unable to report their attitudes
in an unbiased or accurate manner.206  Moreover, research respon-
dents’ answers are context dependent—e.g., who asks the question
and how it is asked.207
These concerns gave rise to the creation of research measures that
indirectly gauge attitudes.  Presumably, research participants are una-
ware of the relationship between these measures and the attitudes
they are employed to ascertain. Indirect measures also seem to mini-
mize respondents’ strategic responding.208  Accordingly, these mea-
sures have evolved from projective tests209 to a wide variety of
contemporary techniques, which fall into three general categories: (1)
202. Id.
203. Luigi Castelli et al., Implicit Ingroup Metafavoritism: Subtle Preference for Ingroup Mem-
bers Displaying Ingroup Bias, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 807, 807 (2008).
204. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 200, at 951.
205. Brian A. Nosek, Moderators of the Relationship Between Implicit and Explicit Evaluation,
134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 565, 570 (2005).
206. Id. at 568 (“People might be unwilling to report an evaluative response that comes to
mind because (a) they do not others to know about it, or (b) the feeling is unwanted in the sense
that it is not endorsed or accepted as one’s evaluation.”).
207. See generally ROGER TOURANGEAU ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SURVEY RESPONSE
(2000); SEYMOUR SUDMAN ET AL., THINKING ABOUT ANSWERS: THE APPLICATION OF COGNI-
TIVE PROCESSES TO SURVEY METHODOLOGY (1995).
208. Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz, Introduction, in IMPLICIT MEASURES OF ATTI-
TUDES 1 (Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007).
209. Howard M. Prohansky, A Projective Method for the Study of Attitudes, 38 J. ABNORMAL
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 393, 393–94 (1943).
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reaction time measures;210 (2) language measures;211 and (3)
psychophysiological measures.212  An exhaustive account of the vari-
ety of implicit measures exceeds the scope of this article.213  However,
among the most typically used measures are subliminal priming and
the Implicit Association Test (IAT).214
Cognitive psychology research into subliminal priming indicates
that exposure to a concept facilitates the later recognition of related
concepts.215  As Professors Bernd Wittenbrink and Norbert Schwarz
explain, “A common explanation for this phenomenon holds that ex-
posure to the initial concept (the prime) activates semantically related
concepts in memory, thus reducing the time needed for their
identification.”216
Researchers have developed various priming procedures to mea-
sure attitudes derived from the seminal work of Professors David E.
Meyer and Roger W. Schvaneveldt.217  In two different experiments,
subjects were simultaneously presented with two strings of letters, one
string displayed visually above the other.218  In the first experiment,
participants responded “yes” if both strings were words; otherwise
they responded “no.”219  In the second experiment, participants re-
sponded “same” if the two strings were either both words or both
nonwords; otherwise they responded “different.”220  Participants re-
sponded “yes” or “same” for pairs of commonly associated words
more quickly than they did for pairs of unassociated words.221
210. Greenwald et al., supra note 198, at 5.
211. Anne Maas et al., Linguistic Intergroup Bias: Evidence for In-Group Protective Motiva-
tion, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 512, 512–13 (1996).
212. Tiffany A. Ito & John T. Cacioppo, Attitudes as Mental and Neural States of Readiness:
Using Physiological Measures to Study Implicit Attitudes, in IMPLICIT MEASURES OF ATTITUDES
125, 125–26 (Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007).
213. For a more in-depth review of the implicit measurement literature, see IMPLICIT MEA-
SURES OF ATTITUDES (Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007).
214. See generally S.T. Murphy & R.B. Zajonc, Affect, Cognition, and Awareness: Affective
Priming with Optimal and Suboptimal Stimulus Exposure, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
723 (1993); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cogni-
tion: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464 (1998).
215. James H. Neely, Semantic Priming Effects in Visual Word Recognition: A Selective Re-
view of Current Findings and Theories, in BASIC PROCESSES IN READING: VISUAL WORD REC-
OGNITION 264, 264 (Derek Besner & Glyn W. Humphreys eds., 1991).
216. Wittenbrink & Schwarz, supra note 208, at 5.
217. David E. Meyers & Roger W. Schvaneveldt, Facilitation in Recognizing Pairs of Words:
Evidence of a Dependence Between Retrieval Operations, 90 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 227,
231–32 (1971).
218. Id. at 227.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 229.
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“Same” responses were slowest for nonword pairs.  “No” responses
were faster when the top string in the display was a nonword, whereas
“different” responses came more quickly when the top string was a
word.222  As has been demonstrated in countless replication studies,
participants make such decisions more quickly when the prime223 and
target string share some semantic relationship.224  So, in theory, the
prime activates semantically related concepts in long-term memory,
resulting in faster recognition of and response to related targets.225
Professor Russell H. Fazio and his colleagues believed that such a
priming technique could be extended to attitudes.226  To test this, they
subliminally presented an object to participants in the study, and then
tested the extent to which that object would evoke positive or nega-
tive attitudes later.227  Professor Fazio and his colleagues found
greater facilitation “when positively valued primes were followed by
positive targets and when negatively valued primes were followed by
negative targets than when the prime-target pairs were incongruent in
valence.”228
Almost a decade later, Professor Fazio and his colleagues extended
this technique to racial attitudes.229  Specifically, they used black and
white faces as primes, and adjectives with positive or negative conno-
tations, for example, “good” and “bad.”230  Participants had to push
keys labeled either “good” or “bad” as quickly as possible.231  White
participants’ reaction times to the “good” words were faster following
presentation of white faces.232  Their reaction times to the “bad”
222. Id. at 231–32.
223. In the evaluative priming method, subjects classify each of a series of target words based
on the target word’s evaluative meaning, with each target word immediately preceded by a to-
be-ignored prime word.  Prime-target evaluative congruence facilitates responding to the target,
producing variation in response latencies that can be used to measure automatic evaluation of
the prime category. Greenwald et al., supra note 214, at 1477.
224. Meyers & Schvaneveldt, supra note 217, at 232–33.
225. James H. Neely, Semantic Priming and Retrieval from Lexical Memory: Roles of Inhibi-
tionless Spreading Activation and Limited-Capacity Attention, 106 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
GEN. 226, 226 (1977).
226. See Russell H. Fazio et al., On the Automatic Activation of Attitudes, 50 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 229 (1986).
227. Russell H. Fazio et al., Variability in Automatic Activation as an Unobtrusive Measure of
Racial Attitudes: A Bona Fide Pipeline?, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1013, 1013 (1995).
228. Russell H. Fazio et al., On the Automatic Activation of Attitudes, 50 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 229, 235 (1986).
229. Fazio et al., supra note 227, at 1013.
230. Id. at 1015.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1016.
2014] THE NTH DECREE 97
words were quicker when those words followed the presentation of
black faces.233
Building upon Professor Fazio’s work, the IAT has become the
dominant attitude measure employed to circumvent strategic respond-
ing or responding that merely reflects a lack of insight on the part of
respondents.234  The IAT assesses the ease with which individuals as-
sociate various categories based on reaction times.235  Accordingly,
the IAT permits an inference about attitudes because it is generally
easier to respond quickly to items from two categories that are cogni-
tively associated with each other.236  The most widely used IAT (the
Race IAT) assesses implicit attitudes toward blacks vis-a`-vis whites.237
In the Race IAT, study participants first practice distinguishing
black and white faces by responding to images of faces by pressing a
computer key on the left side of the keyboard for one racial category
and on the right side of the keyboard for another racial category.238
Participants next practice distinguishing positive adjectives words
from negative adjectives in a manner similar to that used for distin-
guishing black and white faces.239  The next two tasks, given in a ran-
domly determined order, use all four categories (black faces, white
faces, positive adjectives, and negative adjectives).240  One task re-
quires one response, for example, pressing a left-side key, when the
respondent sees black faces or positive words, whereas white faces
and negative words call for the other response, for example, pressing a
right-side key.241  In the remaining task, white faces share a response
with positive words and black faces with negative words.242  For
American respondents who take the Race IAT, response speeds are
often faster when white faces are paired with positive words.243  This
finding supports the conclusion that white-positive is a stronger associ-
ation than black-positive (and conversely, white-negative is a weaker
association than black-negative). In the context of racial bias, these
results suggest an implicit attitudinal preference for whites over
233. Id. at 1013.
234. Greenwald et al., supra note 214, at 1464.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1464–65.
237. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 200, at 952.
238. Fazio et al., supra note 227, at 1015.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1016.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstra-
tion Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RES., & PRAC. 101, 105 (2002).
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blacks.244  The IAT’s general method can be, and has been, adapted to
measure a wide variety of group-valence and group-trait associations
underlying attitudes and stereotypes.245
Implicit attitudes are unremarkable in the sense that people harbor
them with respect to a wide variety of things.  One study found that
people hold implicit attitudes about things as simple as yogurt brands,
fast food restaurants, and soft drinks.246  Certainly, in such a context,
these implicit attitudes may predict behavior that may largely be
deemed as inconsequential, at least with respect to any macro-level
considerations.247  However, group identities may provide for a
heightened level of concern.  For example, Americans tend to implic-
itly favor the United States over Japan and “American” over “Cana-
dian.”248  Not surprisingly, they implicitly favor American places over
foreign places.249  They also implicitly favor thin people over obese
people, and young people over old people.250  Heterosexuals are fa-
vored over homosexuals, rich over poor, and Jews over Muslims—all
implicitly.251
Research on implicit racial attitudes and bias—particularly research
focused on blacks—is the most robust area of implicit attitudes and
bias research.252  As previously indicated, people’s explicit and im-
plicit attitudes are often not completely concordant.253  This may be
no more evident than when it comes to the hotbed issue of race.  For
example, research suggests that Latinos demonstrate a fairly limited
explicit preference for whites (25.3% favor) over blacks (15.0%
favor), with most showing no preference (59.7%).254  However, at the
implicit level, Latinos show a substantial preference for whites (60.5%
favor) over blacks (10.2% favor), with far fewer showing preferential
neutrality (29.2%) in comparison to their explicit preferences.255
244. See id.
245. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 200, at 952.
246. Dominika Maison et al., Predictive Validity of the Implicit Association Test in Studies of
Brands, Consumer Attitudes, and Behavior, 14 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 405, 405 (2005).
247. Malte Friese et al., Implicit Consumer Preferences and Their Influences on Product
Choice, 23 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 727, 736 (2006) (finding that participants who possessed
incongruent explicit and implicit preferences in regard to generic food products and well-known
food brands were more likely to choose the implicitly preferred brand when choices were made
under time pressure).
248. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 200, at 957.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 952.
253. Id. at 949.
254. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 200, at 958.
255. Id.
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Asians and Pacific Islanders exhibit more of an explicit preference for
whites (32.9% favor) over blacks (9.6% favor), with only slightly
fewer showing preferential neutrality (57.5%) as compared to Lati-
nos.256  However, at the implicit level, they demonstrate a substantial
preference for whites (67.5% favor) over blacks (7.7% favor), with far
fewer showing preferential neutrality (24.8%) when compared to their
explicit preferences.257  Whites show much more of an explicit prefer-
ence for whites (40.7% favor) than blacks (3.4% favor), especially
when compared to other racial groups, but still more than half
(56.0%) show no preference.258  Yet, at the implicit level, whites show
a robust preference for whites (71.5% favor) over blacks (6.8% favor),
with only 21.7% showing no preference.259  In an Internet-based study
conducted by Professor Brian A. Nosek and his colleagues, new data
from three measures available to the public at a demonstration web-
site260 extended the existing evidence concerning implicit and explicit
in-group and out-group bias among whites.261  This study found that a
larger percentage of whites express in-group favoritism on implicit
measures (78.4%) than on explicit measures (51.1%).262
Research on blacks’ implicit racial biases is striking for two reasons.
First, like research on other racial groups, there is a lack of concor-
dance between blacks’ explicit and implicit racial attitudes.263  Second,
although blacks show an explicit preference for blacks (58.9%) over
whites (4.8%), with 36.2% showing no preference, the same cannot be
said implicitly.264  At the implicit level, some research shows that
blacks have no preference at all, with 34.1% favoring blacks, 32.4%
favoring whites, and 33.6% showing no preference.265
Other research bolsters these findings.  For example, among twelve-
to fourteen-year-old blacks, Professor Andrew Scott Baron and his
colleagues found that, at least by age thirteen, young blacks do not
exhibit the in-group preference that has come to be the hallmark of
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Teaching Tolerance, S. POVERTY L. CENTER, http://www.tolerance.org (last visited Feb.
24, 2014).
261. Nosek, supra note 243.
262. John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of
Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 897 (2004).
263. Greenwald & Kriger, supra note 200, at 959–60.
264. Id. at 958.
265. Id.
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whites.266  Professor C. Vincent Spicer found that among black adults,
there is considerable variability in blacks’ implicit racial preferences,
though overall, blacks show a significant preference for whites over
blacks.267  A study by Professor Spicer and his colleagues demon-
strates that between 50% and 65% of blacks exhibit implicit out-
group bias in favor of whites.268  Professor Lesile Ashburn-Nardo and
her colleagues found that 60% of blacks show a pro-white implicit
bias, although they express highly favorable in-group attitudes on ex-
plicit measures.269  Professor Nosek and his colleagues’ Internet-based
study found that blacks show a significant preference for whites over
blacks.270  There, more blacks expressed in-group favoritism on ex-
plicit measures (65.4%) than on implicit measures (40.1%).271  When
attitudes are measured implicitly, 39.3% of blacks show out-group fa-
voritism, which is about the same proportion that showed in-group
favoritism.272  In sum, blacks show strong in-group favoritism explic-
itly, but not implicitly.273
A proliferation of scholarship on employment discrimination high-
lights how implicit race bias may influence cognitive judgment and
decision-making in the employment context.  For example, Professors
Eric Louis Uhlmann and Geoffrey L. Cohen found that job discrimi-
nation may occur when people redefine merit in a manner that fits the
idiosyncratic credentials of individual applicants from desired
groups.274  Participants were assigned male and female applicants to
gender-stereotypical jobs.275  However, participants did not view male
and female applicants as having different strengths and weaknesses.276
Instead, they redefined the criteria for success at the job as requiring
the precise credentials possessed by a candidate of the desired sex.277
266. Andrew Scott Baron & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Development of Implicit Attitudes: Evi-
dence of Race Evaluations from Ages 6 and 10 and Adulthood, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 53, 57 (2006).
267. C. Vincent Spicer, Effects of Self-Stereotyping and Stereotype Threat on African Ameri-
cans’ Intellectual Performance (1999) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kentucky) (on file with
William T. Young Library, University of Kentucky).
268. Jost et al., supra note 262, at 895.
269. Leslie Asburn-Nardo et al., Black Americans’ Implicit Racial Associations and Their Im-
plications for Intergroup Judgment, 21 SOC. COGNITION 61, 73 (2003).
270. Nosek et al., supra note 243, at 105–07.
271. Id. at 105–06.
272. Id.
273. Jost et al., supra note 262, at 897.
274. Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit To Jus-
tify Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474, 474 (2005).
275. Id. at 475.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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While this study focused on sex differences, the finding could be simi-
larly applied to racial categories.
In a collection of studies, Professor Devah Pager concluded that
having a criminal record affects the job prospects of blacks and whites
differently.278  In one study, twenty-three-year-old black and white
male testers were matched based on physical appearance and self-
presentational styles.279  Characteristics that were not naturally identi-
cal between pairs, such as educational attainment and work experi-
ence, were made similar for purposes of the study.280  Testers were
divided into pairs, and one tester was to present himself as having a
criminal record.281  The testers then applied for entry-level positions
requiring no previous work experience and no education greater than
high school identified in the Sunday classified advertisement section
of a large Midwestern city newspaper.282  Professor Pager found that
the negative effect of a criminal record was 40% greater for blacks
than it was for whites.283  In a similar follow-up study, Professor Pager
found that while more than 60% of employers indicated a willingness
to hire a black or white drug offender, only 17% of employers gave
callbacks to white testers.284  In contrast, less than a third of that per-
centage of employers gave black testers callbacks.285
In another noted study, Professors Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil
Mullainathan sent fictitious re´sume´s in response to classified adver-
tisements in Chicago and Boston newspapers.286  They manipulated
perceived race by randomly assigning the re´sume´s either a black-
sounding name or a white-sounding name.287  Employers were 50%
more likely to invite individuals with white-sounding names for inter-
views.288  They also found that for white-sounding names, higher qual-
ity re´sume´s elicited 30% more callback invitations.289  However,
individuals with black-sounding names but higher quality resumes
278. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 938 (2003).
279. Id. at 947.
280. Id. at 949.
281. Id. at 947.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 959.
284. Devah Pager & Lincoln Quillian, Walking the Talk?: What Employers Say Versus What
They Do, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 355, 362 (2005).
285. Id. at 363.
286. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than
Lakisha and Jamal?: A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV.
991, 994 (2004).
287. Id. at 992.
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elicited a far smaller increase in callbacks.290  They also found that the
degree of discrimination is uniform across occupations and, to a lesser
extent, industries.291  Professors Bertrand and Mullainathan found
that even federal contractors and employers who described them-
selves as “equal opportunity employers” discriminate as much as
other employers.292
While these studies do not employ the IAT and do not specifically
focus on hostile work environment discrimination, they highlight the
fact that employers and supervisors may often make employment de-
cisions that are discriminatory and influenced by unconscious biases.
In fact, the Bertrand and Mullainathan study utilizes an oft-employed
priming technique to determine the extent to which explicit informa-
tion that conjures up implicit imagery—for example, racialized
names—influences judgment and decision making.293  In fact, employ-
ers with self-perceptions as rational and fair in their hiring, promotion,
and retention decision making, coupled with unconscious biases, actu-
ally have the tendency to increase employment discrimination.294
Two studies underscore how use of the N-word in the employment
context can create a hostile work environment.  In 1985, social psy-
chologists Jeff Greenberg and Tom Pyszczynski asked black and white
college students to judge a debate.295  They planted individuals in the
audience who, immediately after the debate, either referred to the
black students as the N-word, criticized them in a nonracist manner,
or said nothing.296  Their study indicated that observers who over-
heard the insult were likelier to lower their evaluation of the black
debaters.297  This suggests that racial slurs “can indeed cue prejudiced
behavior in those who are exposed.”298  In a more recent study, social
psychologists Laurie Rudman and Richard Ashmore found that not
only do implicit racial bias scores predict economic discrimination
290. Id. at 992.
291. Id.
292. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 286, at 992.
293. See Sharon L. Segrest Purkiss et al., Implicit Sources of Bias in Employment Interview
Judgments and Decisions, 101 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 152, 155
(2006).
294. Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, “I Think It, Therefore It’s True”: Effects of
Self-Perceived Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination, 104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DE-
CISION PROCESSES 207, 214 (2007).
295. Jeff Greenberg & Tom Pyszczynski, The Effect of an Over-Heard Ethnic Slur on Evalua-
tions of the Target, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 61 (1985).
296. Id. at 64–65.
297. Id. at 65.
298. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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against black student organizations, but they also predict the use of
racial slurs.299
The narrative concerning how implicit antiblack racial biases mani-
fest themselves in behavior among black actors, as opposed to
nonblack actors, has yet to be fully explored by social scientists.  How-
ever, taken together, the existing body of research supports the out-
comes in Johnson and Weatherly because it suggests that implicit race
bias may result in discriminatory use of the N-word by and among
blacks, thus creating a hostile work environment for employees on the
receiving end of the word. Simply put, black supervisors may be just
as likely as white supervisors to discriminate against black employees
on the basis of race or to use the N-word at the workplace in a dis-
criminatory way.
G.  Promoting Fairness, Consistency, and Judicial Efficiency
Application of the same reasonable person standard to hostile work
environment claims involving intraracial and interracial use of the N-
word will also promote fairness.  After all, whether or not nonblacks
can and should use the N-word has been hotly debated.  In a recent
episode of Fox’s television drama Boston Public, a white student calls
a black friend the N-word, causing an offended black student to chal-
lenge the white student to a fight.300  The students’ white teacher leads
a discussion about the N-word that is based on Professor Kennedy’s
controversial book, Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome
Word, and a black teacher asks that the white teacher be terminated
for using the N-word.301  Although this fictional example may seem
somewhat extreme, it is not far from reality.
“Niggas in Paris” won a Grammy in 2012 and sold 436,000 copies in
a week.302  Yet white actress Gwyneth Paltrow came under fire for
reportedly using “ni**as” in a tweet discussing the hit song.303
Rihanna thought it was appropriate to publicly post a photo of herself
with a black toddler captioned “My lil nigga.”304  Yet, when Latina
299. Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit Association
Test, 10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 359, 363 (2007).
300. Martin Kilson, The N-Word as Therapy for Racists, BLACK COMMENTATOR (June 27,
2002), http://www.blackcommentator.com/n_word.html.
301. Is the “N-Word” Going Mainstream?, ABC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2002), http://abcnews.go.com/
2020/story?id=132632&page=1&singlePage=true.
302. See Paul Bright, Op-Ed: Why Rappers Can Say the “N” Word, but Paula Deen Can’t,
DIGITAL J. (July 1, 2013), http://digitaljournal.com/article/353504.
303. Sheila Marikar, Gwyneth Paltrow References N-Word, Upsets Twitter, ABC NEWS (June
5, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/entertainment/2012/06/gwyneth-paltrow-
references-n-word-upsets-twitter/.
304. Owens, supra note 4.
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actress and singer Jennifer Lopez used the N-word in a remix of her
hit song “I’m Real,” civil rights activists demanded an apology, and a
New York radio station threatened to boycott her music.305  Likewise,
after white Food Network star Paula Deen admitted to using the N-
word in the past, her sponsors withdrew their support, signaling an
end to her television career.306  White television personality Bill
Maher came to her defense, asking whether rap songs using the N-
word should be banned.307  Yet, at the 2007 Grammy Awards, songs
containing the N-word, albeit all written or performed by black artists,
were nominated for and won Best Rap Song, Best Rap Solo Perform-
ance, Best Rap Performance by a Duo or Group, and Best Rap
Album.308
Such controversy over use of the N-word is not only confusing but
also gives rise to concerns over fairness and consistency.  After all,
why is a word that is acceptable in a song title unacceptable in the
workplace?  As an editor of a University of North Carolina newspaper
observed, to some, use of the N-word “creates an atmosphere of ac-
ceptance . . . if blacks themselves do it, why can’t others[?]”309  In
response to Rihanna’s post, one commentator observed, “The [N-
word] is derogatory. If some cultures aren’t allowed to say it, no[ ]one
should.”310
Whether the N-word can only ever mean one thing, or whether it is
only appropriate when used by and among members of the black com-
munity, has long been the subject of scholarly and public debate.  Ac-
cording to Professor Randall Kennedy, “words can be used in all sorts
305. Nadra Kareem Nittle, Celebrities Who’ve Sparked Controversy by Saying the N-Word,
ABOUT.COM, http://racerelations.about.com/od/hollywood/tp/Celebrities-Who-Ve-Sparked-Con
troversy-By-Saying-The-N-Word.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
306. Bright, supra note 302.
307. Boyce Watkins, Op-Ed, Bill Maher Defends Paula Deen and Says She’s No Worse Than a
Rapper, NEW PITTSBURG COURIER (June 23, 2013), http://newpittsburghcourieronline.com/2013/
06/23/bill-maher-defends-paula-deen-and-says-she-s-no-worse-than-a-rapper/.
308. Complete List of 2007 Grammy Winners, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 12, 2007,
12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/frontpage/2007/02/12/Complete-list-of-2007-Grammy-
winners/stories/200702120117.
309. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 162.
310. Owens, supra note 4.
What is even worse is how we have gotten so obsessed with who can say it and who
can’t that we have forgotten the actual context of the N-word itself.
. . . .
So if we are to dismiss the N-word from social media usage and urge Rihanna to stop
using it, we ought to as well. We have to discourage it in the lyrics to the music we listen
to. We have to put our friends in check on Facebook and Twitter when they blurt it. We
have to make remind ourselves why it’s unacceptable in the first place.
What isn’t good for someone else shouldn’t be good for us either.
Id.
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of ways.  We are the masters of words.”311  As such, he states that it is
sometimes acceptable for white people to use the N-word.312  For ex-
ample, white author Carl Van Vechten named his book exploring the
life of black people in Harlem Nigger Heaven, and white director
Quentin Tarantino often uses the N-word in the screenplays of his
award-winning films, such as Pulp Fiction.313  Professor Kennedy ar-
gues that such uses are acceptable because they do not aim to oppress
or demean the black community; instead, they intend to reflect the
realities of the lives of black Americans and the way members of the
black community speak and relate to one another.314
However, many members of the black community disagree.  Some
argue that white racists’ historical use of the N-word to subordinate
blacks, standing alone, disqualifies nonblacks from using the word.315
A second theory posits that “equity earned through oppression grants
cultural ownership rights”; put differently, blacks suffered through
denigrating use of the N-word, so they have purchased the exclusive
rights to “monopolize the slur’s peculiar cultural capital.”316  Still
others argue that nonblacks, even those who associate closely with
members of the black community, will never have sufficient intimate
knowledge of the N-word to ever be able to use it appropriately.317
As Michael Dyson, Professor of African-American Studies at DePaul
University, states bluntly, “Here’s a rule of thumb for all white Ameri-
cans . . . as to how to use the [N-word]—Never! See? So that’s a gen-
eral rule of thumb.”318  Likewise, black comedian Chris Rock’s
popular comedy album includes a skit in which a white man ap-
proaches him after a performance of his “I hate ni**ers” skit.319  The
white man appreciatively repeats some of Mr. Rock’s N-word jokes,
and the next sound you hear is the white man being punched.320
311. Is the “N-Word” Going Mainstream?, supra note 301.
312. Id.
313. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 128, 130–31.
314. See id. at 133.
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Such visceral reactions to use of the N-word by nonblacks is more
the rule than the exception.  Operating under the often false assump-
tion that nonblacks’ use of the N-word can only ever mean one thing
has led to what Professor Kennedy calls “troubling tendencies,” such
as blacks’ “overeagerness to detect insult” and “overly harsh punish-
ment[s] of those who use the N-word imprudently or even
wrongly.”321  This not only poses fairness and consistency concerns,
but could also prompt frivolous lawsuits that impede judicial
efficiency.
For example, in 1993, Central Michigan University (CMU) fired a
white basketball coach who stated that the team needed “to have
more ni**ers on the team” during a locker room pep talk even though
the coach asked the team members, both black and white, for permis-
sion to use the word and used it in a positive way to refer to players
who were “fearless, mentally strong, and tough.”322  It is telling that
no team member complained; instead, a student who had quit the
team before the pep talk had occurred lodged the complaint that
eventually resulted in the coach’s termination.323  Although his use of
the N-word was indisputably unnecessary and ill-advised, would CMU
have terminated a black coach that used the word in the exact same
way?
In perhaps an even better illustration of these so-called “troubling
tendencies,” David Howard, a white director of a Washington, D.C.
agency, was forced to resign after his subordinates mistook his use of
the word “niggardly” as a racial slur.324  It is beyond dispute that “nig-
gardly” means “miserly” and is not a racial slur.325  Yet in the public
firestorm that ensued, that indisputable fact seemed lost on Mr. How-
ard’s critics.326  As columnist Tony Snow quipped, “David Howard got
fired because some people in public employ were morons who a)
didn’t know the meaning of ‘niggardly,’ b) didn’t know how to use a
dictionary to discover the word’s meaning[,] and c) actually demanded
that he apologize for their ignorance.”327
321. Id. at 117.
322. Id. at 142–44.
323. Id. at 143.
324. Id. at 120, 177.
325. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 738 (11th ed. 2001).
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327. Id. at 122.  Interestingly enough, Mr. Howard’s coworkers were not the only individuals
to misconstrue the meaning of “niggardly.”  At the University of Wisconsin-Madison, a student
allegedly stormed out of a class crying when the professor used the word during a Chaucer
lecture even though he had previously explained the definition to the entire class. Id. at 123.
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Unfortunately, these “troubling tendencies” have also found their
way into the courtroom, arguably leading to frivolous litigation and
“overly harsh punishments of those who use the N-word,” even when
the speaker lacked racist or otherwise malicious intent.328 Burlington
v. News Corporation highlights the problem that arises when people
falsely assume that the N-word can only mean one thing.329
In Burlington, an award-winning white reporter sued News Corpo-
ration, Fox Television Stations, Inc., and Fox Television Stations of
Philadelphia, Inc. for reverse discrimination because the defendants
terminated him for using the N-word at a meeting of three black and
six white employees.330  Mr. Burlington sought to hold the defendants
liable for the discriminatory animus of his coworkers under a theory
of “subordinate bias liability.”331
The incident occurred during a discussion of reporter Robin Tay-
lor’s story about the NAACP’s symbolic burial of the N-word.332  Al-
though Ms. Taylor used the term “N-word” during her discussion of
the story, when she finished, Mr. Burlington asked “Does this mean
we can finally say the word ‘ni**er?’”333  When Ms. Taylor said she
would not use the full word in her story, Mr. Burlington suggested
that she either write “ni**er” or refer to it as the “racial epithet” in-
stead of using the phrase the “N-word.”334  In response, a black em-
ployee, Nicole Wolfe, became visibly upset and exclaimed, “I can’t
believe you just said that!”335  After the meeting, Mr. Burlington ap-
proached Ms. Wolfe to explain, but Ms. Wolfe would not speak with
him.336  Later, Joyce Evans, a black co-anchor who had not attended
the meeting, told Mr. Burlington that he had upset some of his co-
workers.337  Mr. Burlington opted to individually approach his co-
workers to explain his rationale.338  Afterwards, Mr. Burlington spoke
to Ms. Evans who allegedly stated that “[b]ecause you’re white you
328. Id. at 117.
329. 759 F. Supp. 2d 580 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
330. Id. at 584–85, 589.
331. Id. at 599.  Under this theory, which the Third Circuit has adopted, a company may be
liable for a violation of Title VII even when racial animus did not motivate the ultimate decision-
maker. Id.
332. Id. at 584–85.
333. Id. at 585.
334. Id.
335. Burlington, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 585.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
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can never understand what it’s like to be called a ni**er and that you
cannot use the word ‘ni**er.’”339  Ms. Evans denied saying this.340
Mr. Burlington’s troubles were just getting started.  He alleged that
soon thereafter, he heard Ms. Evans telling other employees that peo-
ple had been terminated for using the N-word.341  On June 24, 2007,
Ms. Evans told Assistant News Director Leslie Tyler, also black, that
employees were upset about Mr. Burlington’s remarks.342 After
speaking with several employees who had attended the meeting, Ms.
Tyler discussed the situation with News Director Philip Metlin, who
escalated the issue to General Manager Mike Renda, a white male.343
Mr. Renda asked Ameena Ali to investigate Mr. Burlington’s re-
marks, but when Ms. Ali asked Mr. Burlington to recount the inci-
dent, he used the N-word.344  The meeting only lasted around five
minutes but resulted in Mr. Burlington’s suspension pending the in-
vestigation.345  Ms. Ali spoke with Mr. Burlington’s coworkers, but
not Mr. Burlington.346  When the investigation ended on July 3, 2007,
the defendants issued Mr. Burlington a “Final Warning and Employee
Assistance Program Referral,” which described his actions as “unac-
ceptable.”347  It also referred Mr. Burlington to sensitivity training and
promised reinstatement if he complied with the training.348
On July 5, 2007, the Philadelphia Daily News published an article
discussing Mr. Burlington’s “‘bizarre’ and ‘shocking’ sermon” about
the N-word as well as his suspension.349  The Philadelphia Tribune and
other media outlets picked up the story.350  As a result, the station
received requests from employees that they not be assigned to work
with Mr. Burlington, as well as concerned calls from the National As-
sociation of Black Journalists and the Philadelphia Association of
Black Journalists.351  Although Mr. Burlington complied with the re-
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Burlington, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 586.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 586–87.  Notably, Mr. Burlington claimed that Ms. Evans only spoke to black at-
tendees, but she claims she spoke to at least one white attendee. Id. at 586.
344. Id. at 587.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Burlington, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 857.
348. Id. at 588.
349. Id. (citing Dan Gross, Fox’s Tom Burlington Suspended, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, July 5,
2007).
350. Id.  Mr. Metlin testified that leaking the information would most likely have led to the
termination of the leaker, but admitted that no investigation of the leak’s source ever took place.
Id. at 588.
351. Id. at 588–89.
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quirements of the employee assistance program, the Station refused to
put him back on the air or renew his contract.352  Mr. Burlington sued,
alleging discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation in
violation of Title VII and other statutes.353
In denying in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
the court observed that the meaning of the N-word varies in “color
and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is
used.”354  In analyzing the historical and contemporary usage of the
N-word, the court acknowledged that although the word has histori-
cally been used as a tool of oppression, it has more recently been uti-
lized as a term of endearment within the black community.355  The
court correctly concluded that the defendants were not permitted to
draw race-based distinctions between employees because doing so
would contravene the spirit and purpose of Title VII.356
To prevail in his suit, Mr. Burlington had to show that he was quali-
fied for his job and suffered an adverse employment action—in this
case, suspension and nonrenewal of his contract—under circum-
stances giving rise to an inference that the adverse employment action
occurred because of a protected trait—here, his race.357  In the Third
Circuit, a plaintiff may create an inference of discrimination by estab-
lishing “a causal nexus between the harm suffered and the plaintiff’s
membership in a protected class, from which a juror could infer, in
light of common experience, that the defendant acted with discrimina-
tory intent.”358
To establish an inference of discrimination, Mr. Burlington pointed
to three black comparators who spoke or wrote the N-word but whom
the Station did not discipline.359  For example, Mr. Burlington claimed
that a black coworker, David Huddleston, once referred to the subject
of a story as “one dumb ni**er.”360  The defendants countered that
the aforementioned instance occurred when the station had a different
manager,361 and “where there are different decision makers, employ-
352. Id.
353. Burlington, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 590.
354. Id. at 596 (quoting Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
355. Id. at 596–97.
356. Id. at 597.
357. Id. at 592 (citing Warenecki v. City of Phila., No 10-1450, 2010 WL 4344558, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 3, 2010)).
358. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2010)).
359. Burlington, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 593.
360. Id.
361. Id.
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ees are not similarly situated.”362  Although the court noted the unde-
niable distinction between employment decisions made by different
managers, it ultimately concluded that it was a “distinction without a
difference”; the situations were “sufficiently similar to make Mr. Hud-
dleston an appropriate comparator.”363  The court was not persuaded
by the defendants’ argument that the situations were not comparable
because Mr. Huddleston’s remark did not incite coworkers’ com-
plaints and negative publicity.364  That argument only underscored
Mr. Burlington’s contention that the coworkers’ reaction and the neg-
ative publicity that prompted his termination was a direct result of
reverse racial discrimination.365  The court observed that Mr. Renda
was not offended by a black coworker’s written account of the meet-
ing even though the coworker wrote the N-word in all uppercase let-
ters twice.366  However, Mr. Burlington’s use of the N-word during his
retelling of the events at the meeting received a very different reac-
tion.  Indeed, Mr. Renda and Ms. Ali contended that for a white man
like Mr. Burlington, use of the N-word was “inappropriate . . .  [at]
any time.”367  The court held that a reasonable jury could conclude
that Mr. Renda’s testimony demonstrated that the defendants were
“unable to draw a principled, nonrace-based distinction between” the
coworker’s use of the word and Mr. Burlington’s use of the word.368
Thus, Mr. Burlington had met his burden on summary judgment.369
Under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, once a plaintiff has
demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to
the defendant to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the adverse employment action.370  Here, the defendants attributed
Mr. Burlington’s suspension and termination to his use of the N-word
at work and the complaints, embarrassment, and negative publicity
that ensued.371
After a defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for an adverse employment action, the burden shifts back to the plain-
tiff to establish that the proffered reason is a mere pretext for discrim-
362. Id. (citing Goins v. EchoStar Commc’ns. Corp., 148 F. App’x 96, 98 (3d Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (nonprecedential)).
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Burlington, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 594.
366. Id. at 594–95.
367. Id. at 595.
368. Id.
369. Id. (citing Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 369 (3d Cir. 2008)).
370. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
371. Burlington, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 595.  The court accepted the proffered reasons and pro-
ceeded to the final step of the McDonnell-Douglas framework. Id. at 596.
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ination.372  To prevail, the plaintiff must “point to some evidence,
direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably ei-
ther (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or
(2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely
than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s ac-
tion.”373  In Burlington, the court concluded that a reasonable jury,
considering the totality of the circumstances, could find that an invidi-
ous discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating fac-
tor or determinative cause of Mr. Burlington’s termination, or that the
defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were not the real
reasons for Mr. Burlington’s termination.374
The Burlington court faced a difficult question: may an employer be
held liable under Title VII for perpetuating the common societal con-
vention that it is acceptable for blacks, but not whites, to say the N-
word?  In reaching its decision, the court acknowledged that histori-
cally, many whites had used the N-word to oppress or denigrate, while
blacks had utilized the word in ironic, satirical ways or as a sign of
affection.375  Still, the court was not persuaded that the historical use
of the N-word was “a justifiable reason for permitting the [station] to
draw race-based distinctions between employees.”376  To the contrary,
Title VII was enacted to counter social norms perpetuating race dis-
crimination; thus, “[t]o conclude that the [station] may act in accor-
dance with the social norm . . . would require a determination that this
is a ‘good’ race-based social norm that justifies a departure from the
text of Title VII.”377  The court determined that a triable issue of fact
existed regarding whether coworkers “exhibiting discriminatory ani-
mus influenced or participated in the [station’s] decision to terminate”
Mr. Burlington.378
Perhaps for reasons of judicial efficiency, Professor Kennedy has
argued that
it is probably erroneous to conclude that the [N-word] itself necessa-
rily furnishes proof of racial discrimination, even when the speaker
is white and the target black. . . . [However,] [a]utomatic labeling of
372. Id.
373. Id. (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
374. Id.
375. Id. at 597.
376. Id.
377. Burlington, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 597.
378. Id. at 600 (quoting Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir.
2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court declined to complete a mixed motive anal-
ysis since doing so would be redundant in light of conducting the McDonnell-Douglas analysis.
Id.
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ni**er may be an efficient shorthand method for judicially assessing
the N-word . . . . [which reflects the notion that] it is better to err on
the side of overenforcement rather than underenforcement.379
Thus, application of a reasonable person standard in all instances in-
volving use of the N-word at the workplace, regardless of the race of
the speaker and target of the speech, will promote judicial efficiency
and uniformity.  In Johnson and Weatherly, that seems to be precisely
what happened.  Arguments regarding whether the target did not find
the speech offensive because of the speaker’s race are more properly
considered in the “unwelcomeness” prong of the hostile work envi-
ronment analysis.  Therefore, application of the reasonable person
standard to judge the objective severity of intraracial use of the N-
word combats “troubling tendencies” and promotes fairness, consis-
tency, and judicial efficiency.
H.  Conclusion
When examining the implications of the N-word in race-based hos-
tile environment claims, the reasonable person standard employed to
determine the severity of the alleged harassment should be colorblind.
For this reason, the outcomes in Johnson and Weatherly are correct
because it is well settled that employment discrimination can occur
between parties of the same race.  Given the N-word’s long history as
a tool of oppression, racism, and denigration, it can reasonably be
construed by members of all races as offensive, regardless of the
speaker’s and target’s race.  Implicit social cognition research under-
scores the argument that use of the N-word may flow from conscious
or subconscious antiblack sentiment, even when used intraracially.  Fi-
nally, applying the same legal standard to intraracial use of the N-
word at the workplace promotes fairness, consistency, judicial effi-
ciency, and hopefully, racial tolerance.
379. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 95.
